

JPRS-TAC-89-038
21 NOVEMBER 1989



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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OAU Condemns Israel, RSA Nuclear Cooperation

*AB0811203589 Dakar PANA in English
1700 GMT 7 Nov 89*

[Text] Addis Ababa, 7 Nov (PANA)—The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on Tuesday condemned the cooperation between Israel and [the Republic of] South Africa [RSA] in the nuclear and military fields.

In a statement issued in Addis Ababa, the organisation expressed concern about information that Israel has given assistance which has enabled South Africa to develop nuclear missiles "in violation of the United Nation's arms embargo".

The same information indicated that Tel Aviv has furnished Pretoria with technology from which the Israeli fighter plane, the "Lavi", was built.

The OAU pointed out that Israel's action demonstrated its insensitivity to the tragic situation of the black population in South Africa and the whole of southern Africa.

Pretoria's policy of internal repression and external destabilisation has led to hundreds of deaths and millions of refugees, the statement said, calling for stricter sanctions against the military arsenal of the Pretoria regime.

The statement said Israel should not be allowed to annihilate the efforts which have been deployed by the international community to force South Africa to eradicate apartheid.

The statement asked the international community to not only condemn that collaboration but to put pressure on Israel to end its illegal cooperation with South Africa in the nuclear and military field.

SOUTH AFRICA

Government, Israel Cooperating on Radar System

*MB1211132389 Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES
in English 12 Nov 89 p 12*

[By Roger Makings]

[Text] South Africa and Israel are said to be co-operating on the development of a hi-tech airborne early warning radar system that is the envy of the Western world.

A prototype of the Phalcon phased-array conformal airborne early warning system, developed by Elta in Israel will begin test flights in two years.

According to a prestigious British aviation magazine, "the project was funded by the Israeli Air Force and a foreign customer, which FLIGHT believes to be the South African Air Force [SAAF]."

Phalcon subsystems have already been tested on a Boeing 707, the optimal platform for the advanced detection system.

The SAAF has three Boeing 707s. Two are thought to serve as in-flight refuellers and the third to have been set aside as an early warning aircraft.

According to Elta president Dr Nino Levy, at least one country (thought to be SA) has signed a contract to buy the Phalcon multi-sensor system that can perform early warning, tactical air and surface surveillance, intelligence gathering and command and control missions.

Dr Levy said the US, which had previously not shown interest in Phalcon, had changed its attitude and "may consider it an option to the airborne early warning systems that will have to replace existing Boeing E-3 AWACS".

The cost of Phalcon is estimated to be half that of the US's E-3 Sentry system and has an even greater capability to detect low-flying aircraft.

This development, follows closely on the heels of the "Arniston missile crisis" in which the CIA charged that Israel and SA had jointly developed and launched a medium-range missile from the Overberg test range on July 5 and which flew 1,400km towards Prince Edward Island. Among the allegations levelled was that Israel was supplying SA with sophisticated technology to produce a nuclear-tipped missile in exchange for enriched uranium. This has been vehemently denied by both countries. But previous evidence of co-operation between the two pariah nations became evident when the SUNDAY TIMES revealed last year that the SAAF had acquired a new front-line fighter.

The similarity between the pride of the SAAF, the single-seater Cheetah E, built by Atlas Aircraft, and the longer serviceing Israeli Kfir was more than just coincidental.

Both aircraft types were revamped Mirage 111s, serving with SA and Israeli air forces, featuring distinctive canards that gave the fighter greater agility and speed. But as one observer pointed out: "There isn't much else one can do with this sort of configuration."

However, collusion doesn't end there. According to the latest edition of Jane's All The world's Aircraft it was "only natural that Israel, Taiwan and South Africa—all subjected to embargoes of one kind or another—pool their technologies to mutual advantage" ensuring survival of their individual armaments industries.

Taiwan recently unveiled its own indigenous fighter, the AIDC Chin-Kuo aircraft and Israel's Lavi fighter, abandoned two years ago because of soaring costs, flew again for the first time in September this year.

SA was said at the time to be helping to finance the Lavi project which incorporated much US technology.

After the cancellation of the Lavi programme it was alleged that Armscor [Armament Corporation of South Africa] had employed 50 Israeli Aircraft Industries specialists who were left unemployed.

Allegations that Lavi technology had been passed on to SA, which desperately needs a state-of-the-art fighter, have met

with strong denials from Israel and SA. Initially the Lavi project was a joint SA-Israeli venture, but SA withdrew in the early stages so that Israel could obtain US aid.

It is, however, known that Atlas, a subsidiary of Armscor, is burning the midnight oil developing its own new-generation fighter.

Neither the SAAF nor Armscor were prepared to comment.

Commentary Discusses Changes in East Europe

*MB1611053089 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0500 GMT 16 Nov 89*

[Station commentary]

[Text] The awesome speed with which once unthinkable changes have been forced on East Germany continues to engage the attention of the world. Having absorbed the stunning impact of the opening of the Berlin Wall and other events, however, governments are beginning to consider the larger implications of what is happening in Eastern Europe.

In particular, the evident unravelling of Moscow's empire has raised serious strategic questions. Hence the convening of a European Community summit meeting on Saturday [18 November]. It will serve as a curtain raiser for the much more crucial meeting in two weeks; time between the leaders of the West and East blocs. President George Bush and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

At stake for both sides is the need to avoid a situation in which the uneasy stability of the power balance could be dangerously jeopardized. The superpowers are acutely aware that the impending collapse of the postwar security system in central Europe could have far-reaching repercussions on their relationship. Whatever happens next, the alignment between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will never be the same again.

In both the European Community and Washington, leaders have been giving public assurances that they will do nothing to destabilize the volatile situation in Eastern Europe. Those assurances are needed by Mr Gorbachev, whose position at home would become politically untenable if the Warsaw Pact were to suffer the loss not only of Poland and Hungary but of its linchpin, East Germany. That such possibilities are even being mooted is an indication of the strength of the popular insistence on reform in those countries. A Bush administration official describes it as a revolutionary situation generating its own dynamic.

It is the astonishing speed with which events have moved in East Germany that has aroused such concerns. From having been a matter to be dealt with sometime in the next century, the reunification of Germany has become the most pressing issue in European politics and East-West relations.

It could immeasurably strengthen the Western alliance against the Soviet bloc. Alternatively, it raises the prospect of a huge central European power reemerging to dominate the region and assert its independence of both blocs. All concerned are well aware of the potentially catastrophic effects of the tensions that would be created by either development. The West German foreign minister, Dr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has gone out of his way to reassure both sides that there will be no unilateral initiatives on German reunification. West Germany's commitment to the European Community and the Western Alliance, he says, remains unchanged.

The challenge now facing Western leaders in Eastern Europe is to encourage reform without raising Soviet security fears to the point of eliciting an explosive counteraction. If that can be managed, there is no doubt that the changes now taking place will eventually work out overwhelmingly to the advantage of the West.

UN Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament Adopted

OW1211143989 Beijing XINHUA in English
1656 GMT 10 Nov 89

[Text] United Nations, November 10 (XINHUA)—The first committee of the U.N. General Assembly this morning unanimously adopted a draft resolution calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to quicken their pace of nuclear disarmament.

The resolution, sponsored by China, urges the two countries, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to further discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to accelerate negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

It reaffirms that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority" and "all the nuclear-weapon states, in particular those possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility."

It believes that "real progress in nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis" and "the qualitative aspect of nuclear arms race needs to be addressed along with the quantitative aspect."

It also extends welcome to the continued implementation of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of their intermediate- and short-range missiles.

Commentary On U.S. Nuclear Strategy

HK1011145089 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 31 Oct 89 p 4

["Weekly Commentary" by Li Qinggong (2621 1987 0501): "The Tendency of Development of the Bush Administration's Nuclear Strategy"]

[Text] Almost at the same time as the Bush administration began examining its foreign policies, the White House senior military advisers have started drawing up new defense policies and military strategies. The nuclear strategy, as the mainstay of the U.S. military strategy, is the first to be affected. A course of updating the nuclear concept and revising the nuclear plan is under way at present. Although the U.S. new nuclear strategy has not been announced, it is possible to get a clue of the tendency of development of the nuclear strategy.

The Bush administration, as its predecessor the Reagan administration did, considers the Soviet Union to be the arch rival of the United States. It firmly takes the U.S. nuclear strength as its foothold, keeps emphasizing the role of the nuclear strength as a deterrent, and continues to modernize its nuclear weapons. However, it shows greater caution and flexibility than before in dealing with such concrete problems as updating the nuclear concept, putting

the deterrent theory to practice, revising the nuclear plan, and developing the nuclear armaments.

The Bush administration believes that "deterrence is the core of the U.S. defense strategy." For this reason, increasing the total deterrence of the nuclear strength is a matter of top priority regarding the U.S. nuclear strategy. The total deterrence refers not only to the optimization of the structure and targeting of the nuclear strength but also to its ability to attack and survive. For a long time, the United States has emphasized increasing the attacking ability of its nuclear strength as the main feature of nuclear deterrence. However, as the situation develops, this option can no longer meet with the demand for nuclear deterrence. The United States believes that a still more serious challenge at present is how to "improve the survival ability of the nuclear strength" and "protect the nuclear deterrent system from attack," and that if this is taken as the main approach to increase its nuclear deterrence, it will be possible to get twice the result with half the effort.

The United States has in recent years added a new component, that is, the strategic defense program, to its total deterrence. The Bush administration is actively revising the theory, strategy, tasks, and demands specified in the strategic defense program suggested by its predecessor, and is striving to put the program into effect. This March, the United States launched the "Delta" satellite for an experiment in the strategic defense program, and in April it successfully experimented on the "Alpha" hydrogen fluoride chemical laser weapon. In addition, Bush also decided to adopt the plan of developing the "brilliant pebbles" antimissile system.

To increase the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent policy, the U.S. Strategic Air Force Command, urged by the Bush administration, is intensively drawing up a new "program for strategic integrated operations." According to this new program, the Bush administration will readjust the targeting of the U.S. nuclear strength, not only taking the Soviet leadership group as a target but also scheduling for launching an attack at the outbreak of war. It has drawn up a "careful plan" and exerted "gigantic efforts" to achieve this end. This program has also suggested a few steps for developing the U.S. nuclear armaments. First, a "crack force" is to be set up for carrying out special tasks of nuclear targeting. This force is not given a target of attack beforehand so that it can act more flexibly when a crisis occurs. Second, three advance-warning measures are to be taken. That is, the "stealth" reconnaissance plane which flies at a speed four times the speed of sound, the remote sensing equipment installed in the Soviet Union, and the reconnaissance satellite with high resolving power are to be used to detect the Soviet key targets. Third, a new powerful weapon is to be developed, which can penetrate the deepest underground defense works of the Soviet Union, thus paralyzing the Soviet command and control system in a few hours after war breaks out. Moreover, to increase the survival ability of its nuclear attacking strength, the United States will shift the key point of its nuclear armaments to the mobile deployment of MX

missiles, midget missiles, B-2 "Stealth" bombers, Trident-II submarine-launched missiles, and the latest "stealth" missiles.

The abovementioned readjustments and changes have been made as a result of the role played by the nuclear awareness of the Bush administration. They also show the tendency of development of the new U.S. nuclear strategy. Judging by the present state of affairs, the nuclear awareness of the Bush administration is also faced with challenges from three quarters: 1) The new ideas, such as "defensive defense" and "reasonable adequacy" which have emerged in the Soviet military theories in recent years and the radical concessions made by the Soviet Union in the question of disarmament, and in particular, the Soviet proposal, made in this September, on separating the strategic armaments talks from the strategic defense program have really been a challenge to the United States in the question of reducing strategic armaments. 2) Some U.S. allies in Western Europe, West Germany in particular, have recently taken exception to the U.S. policy for the development of nuclear strategy and nuclear armaments, pointing out that this policy is incompatible with the relaxation of tension between the East and the West and with the current situation. These countries put forth their opinions by proceeding with their own interests and of Western Europe, thereby placing the United States in a dilemma of "having to safeguard the common safety of the West and also having to maintain the unity of the Western allies." 3) In recent years, there has arisen in the United States, especially in the U.S. Congress, an upsurge of demand for the reduction of military expenses, and the U.S. Government's plan of increasing the military budget has been foiled time and again. In this situation, the Bush administration's attempt to turn its nuclear awareness into policies and concrete measures will be hindered when it comes to the question of financial resources, and the projects put forth in the new "program for strategic integrated operations" can hardly be realized as a whole. In short, it takes time to see whether the Bush administration can keep its nuclear awareness away from being entangled with the above problems and eventually turn it into the ideology guiding the new U.S. nuclear strategy.

Improved National Defense Supply Capacity Viewed

*HK0311143689 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 19 Oct 89 p 2*

[Report by Ma Jingsheng (7456 0079 3932) and Bie Yixun (0446 5030 8113): "China Has Formed a Comprehensive Supply Capacity in National Defense Scientific Research and Testing"]

[Text] In national defense scientific research and testing, China has formed a comprehensive supply capacity with which the country has fulfilled comprehensive supply tasks on several occasions for missile and nuclear tests and the launching of all types of satellites either from the Gobi Desert, the Loess Plateaus, deep valleys, or the high seas.

China's launching and test grounds and monitoring stations are spread over more than 20 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions throughout the country. Most of them are far from cities and life is difficult there. A major test generally requires simultaneous land, sea, and air operations and cooperation between logistics supply departments and other Army units. Coordination and cooperation between different units has helped form an organic entity in supply work, thus effectively ensuring the fulfillment of supply tasks in China's national defense scientific research and testing.

When the Jiuquan Satellite Launching Center planned to launch a carrier rocket into the southern Pacific in May 1980, the "Yuanwang" survey ship was required to set out on its first voyage to a Pacific area near the equator and make the necessary material preparations within a month. At that time, facilities for the ship alone amounted to tens of thousands of sets (pieces) which were scattered around in many provinces and cities throughout the country. In face of this situation the command headquarters fulfilled all supply tasks satisfactorily and in good order. Since 1984 China has successfully launched telecommunications and applied satellites on many occasions. On each satellite launch, the command network and material supply network formed by different work offices and supply stations could make prompt purchases and delivery, thus guaranteeing the fulfillment of tasks.

Now, new bases have been built in many parts of the country to cope with scientific research and testing and livelihood needs. In these parts of the country, enterprises and institutions have been set up, including cultural centers, commercial buildings, banks, post offices, kindergartens, and primary and secondary schools. To improve the living conditions of Army units engaged in scientific research and testing, the State Commission for National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry has built dozens of pig and chicken breeding farms, fodder processing centers, and fish ponds. About 100 service centers built by regimental headquarters last year are now being improved so that they can provide a full service.

Computer Used in Conducting Missile Experiments

*HK0611010989 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 17 Oct 89 p 3*

[Article by Yuan Zhihua (5913 2535 5478): "Missile 'Think Tank'—A Visit to the 'Galaxy' Simulation Laboratory of the Naval Aeronautical Engineering College"]

[Text] Since the birth, development, and application of China's first "Galaxy" computer, the "Galaxy" simulation laboratory of the Naval Aeronautical Engineering College has been applying it to missile weaponry simulation and successfully resolving technological and tactical problems in teaching, training, and scientific research in the missile weaponry system. People call this a missile "think tank."

The "Galaxy" computer simulator, which has a high-speed calculating ability, a huge storage capacity, and complicated logic functions, is the heart of the missile "think tank." It can accurately and quickly handle all technological and tactical problems in the missile weaponry system. The console is a tool for conversation between "man and machine," where working personnel can save information into or retrieve information from the "think tank." Through sound, graphs, and charts, the process of handling various problems and the conclusions drawn by the "think tank" are clearly displayed on the laser screen of the computer.

Comprehensiveness, multiple functions, and high efficiency are the most distinctive characteristics of the "think tank." It can fulfill the designs of and carry out experiments in and demonstrations of missile engineering, missile parameter research, external environmental interference analysis, and launching probability statistics, as well as select the best missile operation plans and launching times. It is an important tool for scientific research and equipment innovation. Moreover, it offers scientific means for practical teaching and training, has reduced the expenses for scientific research, teaching, and training, and has enormously increased efficiency.

In the past, the finalization of a new type of missile or a change of model of a certain missile usually required long-term theoretical demonstrations and numerous live ammunition launching experiments. However, the "Galaxy" simulation laboratory has opened up a new way to demonstrate missiles and carry out experiments. According to the experts, the range practice of the missile being demonstrated and experimented on by the "think tank" can be reduced by a wide margin prior to its finalization. Regarding operation plans, the best time for firing, the feasibility of operations, reliable analyses, and other problems that are of the greatest concern to commanders, the "Galaxy" simulation laboratory can provide immediate and accurate answers under complicated conditions. Moreover, it can also train and assess how well students can carry out their duties at their posts and deal with emergencies, under conditions that simulate actual operations.

These extraordinary functions of the missile "think tank" are the result of 4 years of hard work on the part of more than 60 scientific researchers from the college. All its thinking originates from the collective wisdom of the scientific researchers. The conclusions of the missile "think tank" are derived from overall analyses of the missiles and quick calculations by the "Galaxy" computer, based on the way a man thinks.

AUSTRALIA

Beazley, Cheney Reaffirm Need for Bases

*BK0611075989 Melbourne Overseas Service
in English 0500 GMT 6 Nov 89*

[Text] The United States defense secretary, Mr Richard Cheney, is today joining his Australian counterpart, Mr Kim Beazley, on an inspection tour of the (Haingap) and (Nainga) joint facilities.

At the weekend both men reaffirm their commitments to the bases continued operation. Mr Cheney says they serve a strategic interest of both Australia and the United States by helping monitor and verify compliance with arms control agreements. But Mr Cheney refused to comment on whether (Nainga) has taken on added significance in recent months by assuming responsibility for tasks formerly carried out by a reported network of listening posts inside China.

Radio Australia's Canberra office says this surveillance, neither confirmed or denied by American officials, is believed to have been shut down since the crushing of the pro-democracy movement in China in June.

CAMBODIA

Peace Initiative of USSR, Warsaw Pact Hailed

*BK1311152989 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 1300 GMT 13 Nov 89*

[PRACHEACHON commentary: "Another Major Initiative on Disarmament for Security and Cooperation in Europe and for World Peace"]

[Text] Members of the Warsaw Pact recently met in Warsaw, the capital of Poland, and adopted a resolution clearly expressing its previous and current stand on the necessity to definitively eliminate the danger of the cold war.

To move toward disarmament, the Warsaw Pact proposed many concrete measures, such as that the 35 countries, members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopt a new measure on various military activities, including those by the air force and warships, to prevent war on any scale in Europe. The Warsaw Pact appealed for the immediate start of separate talks on offensive nuclear weapons in Europe and signing a Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing 50 percent of strategic weapons in the near future. Furthermore, the Soviet Union also proposed that the military alliances of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the two biggest opposing military alliances in the world, simultaneously disarm themselves no later than the year 2000.

This is a creative initiative in genuine disarmament. It represents active efforts of the Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union with a spirit of lofty responsibility for peace. This initiative is receiving vigorous support from progressive and peace-loving public opinions in Europe

and in the world. However, the path to building a world free of nuclear weapons and wars, to which all mankind is persistently aspiring, remains a difficult road. The position of the United States and NATO countries still has not given up a war-mongering military policy and confrontation. They responded by indifferently rejecting the constructive initiative of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Washington and the NATO countries demanded that the Soviet Union unilaterally withdraw its forces and weapons from Eastern Europe and that the Warsaw Pact unconditionally disarm itself while demanding that NATO be preserved.

All these activities by Washington and NATO countries have in fact created obstacles, in accordance with their plan, to hinder any process to continue negotiations on arms reduction and disarmament. The Pentagon continues to adhere to the principle of firmly strengthening the maneuver to implement many new measures aimed at increasing NATO military influence to win military supremacy over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, they have maneuvers and measures with Western countries in Europe to launch political, military, and economic campaigns against socialism through perfidious and dark maneuvers aimed at creating problems and further destabilizing socialist countries.

Along with developed and progressive people the world over, the Cambodian people acclaim and fully support the constructive stand and initiative on disarmament of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact members for peace and security in the world. We firmly denounce every activity running counter to the aspiration for peace for all mankind being implemented by the United States and the NATO countries. To pave the way for complete disarmament, it is necessary to accept the initiative of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries and also actively participate in implementing it.

JAPAN

Kaifu Urges Stepped-Up Defense of Sea Lanes

*OW0511053189 Tokyo KYODO in English
0459 GMT 5 Nov 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 5 KYODO—Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu saluted the Maritime Self-Defense Forces, (MSDF) Sunday with a call to step up the protection of Japan's sea lanes.

"As a trading nation surrounded by seas on all sides, it is important for us to guarantee safety of transport on the high seas," Kaifu said during an MSDF review ceremony at Sagami Bay.

Kaifu, commander in chief of the defense forces, is the fifth incumbent prime minister to attend the annual review. Last year's review was canceled because of the late Emperor Showa's illness.

Kaifu reminded the officers and sailors assembled on the MSDF flagship that Japan should make every effort to safeguard peace and security in the world as an "important member of the West."

The premier also vowed that the government would continue to consolidate Japan's national defense by upgrading its defense capabilities and by adhering to Japan's defense pact with the United States.

"The international situation remains confusing and fluid, and it is our job to make our national defense unshakable," Kaifu said.

Kaifu also gave a similar talk during an inspection ceremony of Japan's Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces October 29.

Further on Naval Review

OW0511133689 Tokyo KYODO in English
1212 GMT 5 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 5 KYODO—Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu saluted the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) Sunday with a call to step up protection of Japan's sea lanes.

The hour-long naval review, 18th in a series and the first since 1987, was held off Sagami Bay, Kanagawa Prefecture, west of Tokyo.

The total fleet of 55 vessels, including destroyers and submarines, and 51 navy aircraft, took part in the ceremony, the largest such MSDF event ever.

Some 6,000 members of the general public picked from among 60,000 applicants were invited to witness the review for the first time, along with 230 foreigners, including military attaches stationed in Japan.

Prime Minister Kaifu, commander in chief of the Defense Forces, was aboard the 5,200-ton helicopter-equipped destroyer "Shirane" as the naval review began shortly before 1:00 p.m.

To MSDF officers and sailors assembled on the deck of the flagship, the prime minister said it is important for Japan to guarantee safety of transport on the high seas as a seafaring nation.

Japan should make every effort to safeguard peace and security in the world as an "important member of the West."

The premier, saying the international situation remains confused and fluid, vowed his government would continue to consolidate national defense by upgrading its defense capabilities and by adhering to the defense pact with the United States.

Destroyers sailed past in Sagami Bay, antisubmarine rockets were fired, and antisubmarine helicopters flew from the deck, all viewed by the spectators assembled.

The vessels attending the annual ceremony skirted Uraga Waterway in Tokyo Bay, the site of the collision between

the MSDF submarine "Nadashio" and a sports fishing boat "Fuji Maru No 1" in July last year which killed 30 of the 48 people aboard the latter.

Kaifu inspected the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces on October 29.

NORTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry on Denuclearization of Korea

SK0911093089 Pyongyang Domestic Service
in Korean 0700 GMT 9 Nov 89

[Text] On 9 November the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a news conference with domestic and foreign reporters at the Cultural Palace of the People in connection with the issue of making the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone, and issued a statement. Respectfully placed in the forefront of the news conference site was a portrait of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song. The press conference was attended by reporters from newspapers, news agencies, and broadcasting stations in Pyongyang, and by foreign correspondents and functionaries concerned with publication staying in our country.

We will now report on the news conference.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified person] We will now begin the news conference. The topic of the news conference is the issue of making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone. To begin with, Comrade (Song Hak-yong), vice minister of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will make some remarks.

[(Song)] As reported, on 1 November contacts were made in Beijing between counselors at the embassies of the DPRK and the United States there. In this round of contacts, as a measure to alleviate tension on the Korean peninsula and to remove the danger of nuclear war, our side advanced a proposal to the U.S. side for holding tripartite negotiations between us, the United States, and South Korea for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. The U.S. side said that it would make a reply to this. Meanwhile, the U.S. side said that it would report on the 1 November contacts without giving details. However, it unilaterally reported on the contacts favorable to it.

Many people at home and abroad have asked us what we proposed to the U.S. side. Therefore, recognizing that it is necessary to make public our proposal to the U.S. side, we will today make it public in the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I will read the statement of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The statement of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

To prevent the danger of nuclear war and guarantee peace on the Korean peninsula is a great concern of mankind and one of the urgent tasks for peace in the world.

Despite the present new trend toward international detente and the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons, the situation on the Korean peninsula is getting aggravated as

time goes by, and the danger of nuclear war is ever increasing. These developments cause serious uneasiness and deep apprehension among the world's peace-loving people.

The government of our Republic took a series of important initiatives to alleviate the situation on the Korean peninsula and to remove the danger of nuclear war, and has so far made continued efforts to realize them.

The DPRK Government already clarified at home and abroad its stand to create a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula through the 23 June 1986 statement and the 13 July 1987 Foreign Ministry statement.

However, instead of responding to our peace-loving proposal, the United States is stepping up nuclear war preparations while further increasing nuclear armed forces under the cloak of what they call security, allegedly to protect South Korea from the fictitious threat of southward invasion.

As a result, today, South Korea has turned into a comprehensive nuclear offensive base full of various nuclear weapons, means of nuclear delivery, and nuclear bases and depots, and has turned into a hotbed of nuclear war that threatens peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

The United States not only turned South Korea into the biggest nuclear forward base in the Far East but also frequently conducts large-scale military exercises in a bid to provoke a nuclear war in Korea.

The United States conducts every year "Team Spirit" joint military exercises together with South Korea, mobilizing ground, aerial, and sea nuclear offensive means, including nuclear war command aircraft, and staged the large-size "Pacex-89" military game in broad areas of the Pacific. This, too, is part of nuclear war preparations and a test nuclear war for a surprise attack on our Republic.

Due to such adventurous war provocation maneuvers by the United States, a very acute situation has been created on the Korean peninsula, where a war may break out at any moment.

It is quite imaginable that if a war is ignited on the Korean peninsula, it will easily spread into a global nuclear war and bring a catastrophic nuclear disaster not only to our people but also to all human beings.

We do not want a thermonuclear war to be ignited with the Korean peninsula as a fuse.

It is the invariable stand of our Republic to ease tension on the Korean peninsula and secure peace in Korea and Asia and the rest of the world through dialogue and negotiations.

In light of the acute situation created on the Korean peninsula, the DPRK Government considers it necessary to immediately hold negotiations among parties concerned to discuss the issue of establishing a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and of taking practical measures to safely guarantee its position.

First, the question of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is the issue to be discussed and solved between us and South Korea. However, since the U.S. nuclear weapons are actually deployed in South Korea, tripartite talks between us, the United States, and South Korea should be held to discuss and solve the question of withdrawing the nuclear weapons from South Korea.

We propose to hold such negotiations in Geneva or any other mutually agreeable place within the year.

Second, if the tripartite talks reach an agreement on the issue of withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons, the North and the South of Korea should hold talks to adopt a joint declaration on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, and should discuss and settle the question of demanding that the nuclear powers give legal guarantees.

The North-South joint declaration should include the question of declaring the Korean peninsula and its 12 miles of territorial waters and air a nuclear-free zone; the question of refraining from the testing, production, storage, and introduction of nuclear weapons by the North and South of Korea; the question of banning the deployment of foreign nuclear weapons and the entrance and exit and passage of foreign nuclear vessels and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons; and matters related to the progress of withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, and mutual information on and verification of the progress in withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and the implementation of the commitments by the North and South.

The document whereby the nuclear powers shall provide guarantees should stipulate their obligations to respect the position of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and to desist in any case from nuclear threats and attack against the North and South of Korea.

Talks between the North and South of Korea may be divided into expert-level talks for drafting a joint declaration and document of guarantees, and talks between representatives of authorities for their formal adoption.

The United States has no grounds to deploy massive nuclear weapons in South Korea and to turn South Korea into a nuclear base to confront us, a non-nuclear state.

Denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is a task that cannot be delayed any longer, because it is the matter of removing one of the most dangerous sources of nuclear war in the world.

If the Korean peninsula is turned into a nuclear-free zone, the people in this region will be free from the danger of nuclear war and make a substantial contribution to the cause of peace in Korea and the rest of the world. [Dated] 9 November 1989, Pyongyang

[Unidentified person] If you have any questions, please ask them.

[First reporter] I am a reporter from the Central Broadcasting Committee. How do you think the United States would react to the DPRK proposal for negotiations?

[(Song)] The United States has opposed the proposal for establishing nuclear-free zones throughout the world, including on the Korean peninsula. However, this issue has now become a trend toward disarmament. In addition, in practice, the United States is holding disarmament talks with other foreign countries.

With regard to our proposal for negotiations, the U.S. side said that it would respond. However, we have heard nothing yet.

As for our proposal, I think that there is no reason whatsoever for the United States to oppose it.

We expect that the United States and South Korea would respond to our proposal for negotiations.

I think that whether they respond to our proposal for negotiations or oppose it will serve to illustrate whether or not they oppose the alleviation of tension and the removal of the nuclear danger from the Korean peninsula.

[Second reporter] I am a reporter from NODONG SINMUN. You have said that at the meeting held this time, the government of the Republic put forth the proposal for negotiations to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. In this regard, I would appreciate it if you would tell us about its concrete intentions.

[(Song)] We put forth this time the proposal for holding tripartite negotiations between us, the United States, and South Korea, as a way to ease tension and remove the danger of nuclear war from the Korean peninsula. Its basic intention, it can be said, is, in a nutshell, to remove the nuclear danger from the Korean peninsula and to realize its denuclearization in practice and, thus, to practically remove the danger of a nuclear war from Korea and from the rest of the world and to prevent the danger of nuclear catastrophe that the Korean people may suffer.

[Unidentified person] Do you have any further questions? If not, we will now close this news conference. Thank you for your participation. [end recording]

Statement on Nuclear Talks With U.S. Discussed
SK1111071589 Pyongyang Domestic Service
in Korean 1150 GMT 10 Nov 89

[Commentary by station commentator Kim Kyong-pok: "The Negotiation Meeting for the Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone Should Be Held at an Early Date"]

[Text] As has been reported, there was contact between the counselors of the embassies of the DPRK and the United States in Beijing, China on 1 November.

As to this contact, the U.S. side, although it had said that it would report it without divulging its content, unilaterally reported it in a manner to its advantage. Hence, we decided that it would be necessary for us to make public at

home and abroad the contents of our proposal to the U.S. side, and issued a DPRK Foreign Ministry statement on 9 November.

According to this statement, the DPRK Government proposed to the U.S. side that tripartite talks among the parties concerned, namely, us, the United States, and South Korea be held before the end of this year, in Geneva or at some mutually agreeable place, to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and to take practical measures to safely guarantee its position.

We also proposed, if an agreement is reached in the tripartite talks on the issue of the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, that the North and the South of Korea hold talks, adopt a joint declaration for making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, and discuss and settle the question of demanding that the nuclear powers give legal guarantees. We also disclosed the contents to be reflected in the North-South joint declaration and in the document of guarantees given by the nuclear powers. These contents envisage that the North-South joint declaration shall contain such matters as declaring the Korean peninsula and its territorial waters and airspace to be a nuclear-free zone, refraining from the testing, production, storage, and introduction of nuclear weapons by the North and the South, banning all entries, exits, and passage of nuclear weapons, and mutual information on and verification of the progress in withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and the implementation of the commitments by the North and the South.

The document whereby the nuclear powers shall provide guarantees also envisages the stipulation of their obligations to respect the position of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and to desist from nuclear threats and attack against the North and South of Korea. It also clarifies the measures for drafting the joint declaration and the document of guarantees.

Our proposal for holding tripartite talks among us, the United States, and South Korea is the most just proposal to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone.

As everyone knows, the government of the Republic has proclaimed its position as to the issue of establishing a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, and has been making every effort to realize it.

However, the U.S. imperialists, who have turned South Korea into the largest nuclear forward base in the Far East—densely deployed with some 1,000 nuclear weapons—are frenziedly accelerating the preparations for nuclear war, further building up nuclear arms in South Korea under the pretext of a nonexistent threat of southward invasion.

The "Team Spirit" war exercises, which the U.S. imperialists, having worked out a nuclear war plan, conduct annually with the South Korean puppet armed forces, directly dispatching the nuclear war command plane and various other means of nuclear strike, and the large-scale "Pacex-89" military exercise are part of these nuclear war

preparations, and are test nuclear war exercises aimed at a surprise strike against our Republic.

Because of these dangerous war maneuvers by U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets, a grave situation is created on the Korean peninsula in which a war could break out at any time.

If a war should break out on the Korean peninsula—which South Korea has been turned into a nuclear forward base—it would readily spread into a global thermonuclear war, and this would bring a catastrophic nuclear holocaust to mankind.

Whether we are able to prevent nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and ensure peace or not is an urgent problem related to whether we will be able to save mankind from the danger of a nuclear holocaust. The acute situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula demands that a practical measure be set up at an early date to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

The proposal we made to the U.S. side totally conforms to the trend of the times showing a new phase of detente internationally today and heading for a phase of gradually reducing nuclear weapons. In view of the prevailing acute situation and of the worldwide trend, our proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and to eliminate the danger of nuclear war to ensure peace there is truly just and realistic.

If the Korean peninsula is turned into a zone free of nuclear weapons, one of the most dangerous sites of launching a nuclear war will be eliminated, relieving the people in this region of the danger of nuclear war, and it will practically contribute to the cause of peace in Korea and the world.

Of course, turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is a matter to be discussed and settled between ourselves and South Korea. However, under conditions where U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed in South Korea, where they are under the control of the U.S. imperialists, and where the U.S. imperialists are continuing nuclear war maneuvers in South Korea, the United States becomes an unavoidable direct party concerned to the discussion of this matter.

Therefore, the meeting for a negotiation for making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone should be held at an early date, and the United States should respond to our proposal without delay.

NODONG SINMUN Criticizes South's War Games

*SK1511054289 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0509 GMT 15 Nov 89*

[Text] Pyongyang November 15 (KCNA)—The ever more undisguised war games against the North by the U.S.

imperialists and the No Tac-u group in South Korea are leading the situation on the Korean peninsula to an extremely dangerous brink of war, says NODONG SINMUN Wednesday.

The news analyst notes:

The U.S. imperialists and the puppets had never ceased war exercises. But it is the first time that they have intensively staged war gambles under such labels as "Eagle-89", "Twin Dragon 89" and the like in a little over ten days, starting a new exercise before the on-going one ends.

Tens of thousands of U.S. imperialist aggression troops equipped with nuclear weapons and puppet army over one million strong are constantly ready for an action in South Korea. South Korea has turned into a touch-and-go powder magazine and a hotbed of nuclear war.

No one can tell when the war gambles on such nuclear depot will turn into a war against the North.

The U.S. imperialists and the puppets give off a thick smell of gunpowder, crying over a "wartime", remaining deaf to our peace initiatives. This is an open challenge to our people who are striving for the relaxation of tensions and peace on the Korean peninsula and its peaceful reunification.

The U.S. imperialists pretend in words to be interested in peace on the Korean peninsula, but in actuality they are captive to ambitions of northward invasion.

It has become all the clearer that "peace" and "reunification" mouthed by the No Tac-u group are sham.

If the warmaniacs continue along the road of aggression against the North, the provocateurs will never be safe, warns the paper.

PHILIPPINES

Danger From U.S. Nuclear Weapons Raised

*HK0711025789 Manila Far East Broadcasting
Company in English 2300 GMT 6 Nov 89*

[Text] The use of Philippine ports as transit points or harbors by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons poses a serious danger to the country in terms of radioactivity. This was raised yesterday morning by U.P. [University of the Philippines] political science Professor Rolando Simbulan during a news conference at the National Press Club. Simbulan is the president of the Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition. At the same time, Simbulan expressed confidence that 60 percent of the Filipino population would opt for the removal of the U.S. bases if a massive campaign is held on the ill effects of foreign bases in the country.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

NATO-Pact Officials Continue Roundtable Talks

LD0111212389 Prague CTK in English
1446 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Bonn Nov 1 (CTK correspondent)—A roundtable meeting of representatives of the North Atlantic Assembly and of the parliaments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland continued for the second day here today.

Rear Admiral Hans Frank of the Federal Republic of Germany pointed to the good atmosphere at the Vienna talks on conventional arms cuts and said that though contentious issues still existed, reaching an agreement in 1990 on the basis of the existing proposals is feasible.

Hans Frank welcomed the unilateral disarmament steps of the Warsaw Treaty countries but said the Warsaw Treaty was still superior in conventional weapons and the structure of troops of its member states did not change either.

Czechoslovak delegate Jiri Divis opposed these views, stressing that the structure of the Warsaw Treaty troops has been assuming a defensive character, to which Czechoslovakia contributed actively. He spoke of Czechoslovakia's procedure in unilaterally cutting its troops and said these measures follow from the doctrine of defence, from the principle of reasonable sufficiency. The changes in the organizational structure of the army in 1990 will strengthen its defensive character.

Bohuslav Kucera, the deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak Assembly leading a Czechoslovak delegation here, pointed out the significance of strengthening the control role of parliaments in solving disarmament problems. He said that conversion was bringing also economic problems and therefore an exchange of experiences from solving questions raised by conversion in the economic sphere would be useful.

UN Envoy Reviews CSSR's Disarmament Steps

AU2410103389 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
21 Oct 89 p 7

[CTK report: "Support for the Process of Disarmament; Czechoslovak Delegate's Address in the United Nations"]

[Text] New York— We regard disarmament as the most effective way of strengthening peace and security, Czechoslovak permanent representative to the United Nations Evzen Zapotocky said in the debate of the Political and Security Committee of the UN General Assembly Thursday night [19 October].

He expressed satisfaction at the fact that the process of actual disarmament has started, though it is not without problems.

The Czechoslovak ambassador called attention to a number of specific unilateral measures by which the CSSR, together with the other Warsaw Pact member states, contributes to the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust in

Europe. Some Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia are being withdrawn from Czechoslovak territory; the reduction in the numerical strength of combat units of the Czechoslovak People's Army by 12,000 men has started; and, over a period of time, 850 tanks, 165 armored personnel carriers, and 51 combat aircraft will be taken out of service. Another 20,000 army members are being transferred to army construction units, whose activity has an exclusively civilian character. The shortening of basic military service from 24 to 18 months is being prepared.

Czechoslovakia is reducing its defense spending 15 percent. Production of military technology will be reduced 16 percent this year and 25 percent next year, E. Zapotocky went on to say. He announced that Czechoslovakia has decided to join the standardized system for declaring defense spending that operates under the aegis of the United Nations and to present the corresponding data.

Air Force Proposal Submitted at Vienna Talks

LD1810170789 Prague CTK in English
1414 GMT 18 Oct 89

[Text] Vienna Oct 18 (CTK correspondent)—The Czechoslovak delegation submitted today at the Vienna talks of representatives of the 35 countries of the Helsinki Conference on Confidence-Building Measures in Europe socialist countries' common proposal on observation of air forces activities.

According to this proposal, observers would be invited to military exercises in which more than 250 airplanes would take part or during which more than 500 flights would be realised. The proposal also supposes observers' access to military airports in question and to places of interim deployment of air forces as well as a large use of modern technical devices for ensuring reliable observation.

As Czechoslovak delegation member Vladimir Mohyla stressed, implementation of the proposed measures would considerably contribute to enlarging openness and predictability of military activities and thus to further strengthening of confidence and security in Europe.

Warsaw Pact Chiefs of Staff Meet in Sofia

Compliance with Requirements Stressed

AU0211183089 Sofia BTA in English
1736 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] Sofia, November 2 (BTA)—The chiefs of the general staffs of the armies of the states parties to the Warsaw Treaty held a meeting in Sofia from October 30 to November 2. The meeting was attended by the chief of staff of the joint armed forces.

The participants considered questions concerning the improvement of the joint armed forces to bring them in line with the requirements of the defensive military doctrine of the state parties to the Warsaw Treaty and of the national military doctrines.,

The meeting was held in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding.

Security Problems Discussed

AU0311204189 Sofia BTA in English
1850 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Sofia, November 3 (BTA)—November 2 through November 3 a meeting of the chiefs of the general staffs and the deputy ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member states was held in Sofia.

The meeting discussed questions of the course and prospects of the Vienna Talks on Conventional Armed Forces and Security and Confidence Building Measures, of the participation in the Vienna seminar on military doctrines, of the proposals for "open sky", as well as the openness in the sphere of military activity.

The meeting passed in businesslike and constructive atmosphere and the participants specified and concretized the positions on the discussed problems. The chief of staff of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states and the leaders of the delegations of the Warsaw Treaty member states to the Vienna talks also took part in the meeting.

Pact Forces Army Generals Visit, Hold Talks

Army General Petr Lushev Attends

LD1311191289 Budapest MTI in English
1651 GMT 13 Nov 89

[Text] Budapest, November 13 (MTI)—Army General Petr Lushev, commander-in-chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states, and Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief-of-state of the United Armed Forces, arrived in Hungary on Monday on a brief working visit.

Colonel-General Ferenc Karpati, Hungarian minister of defence, held talks with the military leaders on current issues of the Warsaw Treaty, and preparations for the next committee session of the Warsaw Treaty ministers of defence, planned to be held shortly in Hungary.

Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth met Army Generals Lushev and Lobov on Monday afternoon. Also present at the cordial meeting was Colonel-General Karpati, and Boris Stukalin, ambassador of the Soviet Union to Hungary.

Pact Generals Depart

LD1411212589 Budapest MTI in English
1050 GMT 14 Nov 89

[Text] Budapest, November 14 (MTI)—Army General Pyotr Lushev, commander-in-chief of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states, and Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief-of-staff of the united armed forces left Budapest on Tuesday morning.

BULGARIA

Military Expert Comments on Vienna Talks

AU0211143889 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 31 Oct 89 p 1,4

[Article by Major General Georgi Popov, "military expert, member of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Vienna talks": "Grounds for Certain Optimism"]

[Text] The third round of the Vienna talks on conventional weapons and security and confidence-building measures in Europe ended on 20 October. It took place under the beneficial influence of intensifying detente in international and East-West relations, and improving the European political climate.

The talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO on conventional weapons in Europe took place in an especially dynamic manner.

The businesslike character of those talks was preserved because of the positive influence exerted by the USSR initiatives, proposed in May 1989 on behalf of the Warsaw Pact, and the subsequent proposals of U.S. President Bush and decisions of the NATO session. The readiness of all delegations to seek a solution even to the most complex problems was evident. The detailed proposals made on many of the issues discussed at the talks was an expression of this readiness.

At the previous two rounds it was agreed to decrease personnel, aircraft, helicopters, tanks, artillery, and infantry combat vehicles, and set equal limits for the two military-political alliances' weapons.

During the third round the countries concentrated on formulating the definitions and code for calculating the conventional armed forces' categories that will be decreased. Great attention was devoted to issues related to exchanging information and control.

As a result of the realism and constructive approach that were demonstrated, the sides agreed on the first definition—artillery. It clearly indicates that all artillery systems of 100mm caliber and above capable of striking ground targets from closed fire positions, will be decreased. This includes artillery guns, howitzers, mortars, and salvo-firing rocket systems.

There were real possibilities of agreeing on the definitions of other categories of weapons. However, these were not utilized, mainly because of the position of certain Western countries.

What are the positions of the two alliances on the other five elements of conventional armed forces that will be encompassed by the decrease?

Noting the great role of personnel, the Warsaw Pact countries think that it is necessary to reduce personnel and set specific quantity limits. The NATO states admit that personnel represent one of the components of military

potential. However, according to them, its role is less significant than the role of weapons. Because of this, as well as because of the difficulty of controlling personnel, the West is opposed to the establishment of limits within the two alliances. The West proposes to effect the personnel reduction in an indirect manner, within the context of weapons' cuts. The socialist countries also propose to reduce and set equal limits to the two alliances' conventional armed forces personnel deployed outside of the national territories, within the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO thinks that this should refer only to the United States and the USSR. England, France, Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands, which together have almost 160,000 armed troops in the FRG, are excluded.

The issue of air forces, on which the positions of the two sides differ most significantly, appears to be one of the most difficult and complex ones. The Warsaw Pact countries consider that a front-strike tactical air force is one of the most dangerous potentials for a sudden strike and for the conduct of large-scale attack operations. Therefore, the initial documents submitted by them proposed that the cuts and limitations apply to precisely this kind of air force. However, noting the considerations of the West and willing to seek a compromise solution to the problem, the socialist countries submitted a new document during the third round. It proposes to include in the reductions all combat aircraft of the front/tactical air force. However, the Western states continue to insist on including antiaircraft air force fighters, which have a purely defensive character, and cannot strike ground targets; the ground-based naval air force, which is a component of the naval forces, which, according to their mandate, are excluded from the talks; and the medium [srednitye] nuclear weapons-carrying bombers, which could be the subject of other talks.

There is a mutual agreement between the sides on the issue of the helicopters, according to which transportation helicopters will not be included in this category. The basic problem is in the different criteria used to define combat helicopters. The socialist countries consider that the criteria for defining combat helicopters must be whether those helicopters are armed with equipment for combat tasks. According to the West it would be difficult to distinguish between the functions of helicopters of the same type. Any modification would not change their possibilities. Therefore, even if a single combat helicopter of a certain type exists in the zone covered by the talks, all modifications aimed at designating it for the implementation of other tasks, including transportation, must be included in the reductions.

The basic difficulty in resolving the issue of tanks is the reluctance of certain Western countries to include light tanks. The acceptance of such a proposal would mean to create conditions facilitating the arms race. Taking the modern level of military technology into consideration, it would not be difficult to construct a tank which despite its light weight could have the firepower and other tactical-technical characteristics of the basic modern combat tank.

The West applies the same selective attitude to infantry combat vehicles. The Warsaw Pact countries insist on including all types of this category—ground troops' armored vehicles, armored personnel carriers, heavy weapons-carrying armored vehicles, and combat reconnaissance vehicles. The Western concept on those means is based on the criteria related to their ability to conquer and maintain territory. According to the West only the ground forces' combat vehicles and the armored personnel carriers have such ability.

During the third round of the talks, countries from both alliances submitted proposals on exchanging information and control over the implementation of the agreements. Both documents envisage a broad exchange of information on the quantity of personnel, structure and deployment of troops, quantity of weapons in the various formations encompassed by the treaty, and on assault bridge-laying vehicles. A broad system of control and verification has been proposed. It includes on-site inspections without the right to refuse such inspections, use of national and international technical means, and the establishment of a joint consultative organ to review issues related to implementing the obligations that have been assumed. Many differences on a number of issues exist between the two alliances, along with the proximity or similarity of their proposals. The essential difference affects the issue of how far down in the organizational hierarchy the exchange of information will go. NATO proposes to exchange information down to the level of battalion/squadron, while the Warsaw Pact—down to the level of regiment and similar formations. Assessing that parity in the quantity of conventional weapons in itself, even at lower levels, is not a guarantee of stability and security in Europe, the two sides propose stabilizing measures. The delegations of the Warsaw Pact countries submitted specific proposals aimed at even greater openness [otkrytost] and predictability in respect of military activity. A whole system of measures related to advance notice of and limiting within certain frameworks the following developments: military maneuvers in Europe, mobilization of reserve forces, and the movements, concentration, and transfer of troops and weapons.

Regardless of the differences that exist in the positions of the two sides, the presence of close or similar elements not only in their conceptual approaches, but also in most of the specific measures proposed by them, will give a constructive and objective character to the discussion of the issues related to measures on exchanging information, control, and stabilization, which will occupy a central place in the next round of talks.

Generally, the proposals submitted during the third round and the lively discussions of specific issues created an opportunity for clarifying the countries' positions and approaches to a greater degree. Now the sides have a better idea of what the basic problems are, on which they must concentrate their attention in order to accelerate the talks on conventional weapons in Europe.

The talks of the 35 on security and confidence-building measures in Europe took place in a businesslike and generally constructive atmosphere, but were less intensive.

At the present stage they still are at the level of clarifying and outlining the positions of the countries. The ever clearer dependence between the two kinds of talks, and the prospects of adopting at the conventional armed forces talks more comprehensive measures on exchanging information, control, limiting military activity, and so forth, all of which are basic elements at the talks of the 35, have a certain retarding effect on the talks of the 35. In this context a striving is evident on the part of the neutral and nonaligned countries to await the results of the talks on conventional armed forces.

During the third session's discussions the efforts of all countries were directed toward substantiating their earlier proposals. Most of the difficulties are encountered while trying to resolve issues related to expanding the scope of security and confidence-building measures, and limiting military activity. At the second session the socialist countries submitted specific proposals on the exchange of information on the structure of the participating countries' armed forces, and encompassing and limiting the entire military activity of those countries. The position of the neutral and nonaligned countries is similar to that of the Warsaw Pact countries in anything related to statistical information. NATO categorically opposes the measures proposed by the Warsaw Pact on including the naval and air forces and their military activity.

However, none of this prevented the achievement of the first agreement at the talks. It was decided to conduct a seminar at a high military level in 1990, at which the military doctrines will be studied and compared. Indeed, thus the idea proposed by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, in 1987 in Berlin, is being implemented. Both the military-political, as well as the military-technical aspects of the military doctrines will be discussed at the seminar. This will include issues such as the troops' organizational structure, quantity, weapons, deployment and training, and military budgets.

The results of the past three rounds of the two kinds of talks in Vienna give grounds for certain optimism. Differences between the sides are evident. However, similarities, proximity, and a coming closer together on many issues also are evident. Improving the political climate in Europe and the enhancing the political readiness of the Warsaw Pact and NATO states to reach a preliminary agreement at the conventional armed forces talks, create a favorable basis for ensuring successful developments at the talks.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Commentary Criticizes U.S. Disarmament Stance

AU0611181789 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 2 Nov 89 p 5

[Golo Schmidt commentary: "Who Wants To Dupe Whom?"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the week, a little bit of progress has been made on the path of disarmament. On Tuesday [31 November] the Soviet Union withdrew the first of four remaining nuclear submarines of its Baltic Fleet from service. Two had already been liquidated over the past years, the other three will be scrapped by 1990, including their nuclear weapons.

What is making the Baltic Sea safer and constitutes an advance move to turn this sea—as Gorbachev recently admonished in Helsinki—into a nuclear-free zone, was immediately presented as an evil trick by Washington. The Pentagon thought to be able to immediately uncover the whole thing: The submarines in question are only old ones, anyway.

Let us assume that this is correct: Nevertheless, there remains the question of who wants to dupe whom. So far, Washington has always painstakingly counted old equipment, when it wanted to list the Soviet potential of threat. And, second, what is much more decisive and, basically, a simple truth, there is probably no difference in whether one is killed by an old weapon or by a new one.

In addition, Gorbachev gave assurances that the scrapped submarines and missiles will not be replaced. This is an attitude which certainly reflects a new way of thinking—even more, it reflects simple reason. However, some people overseas seem to be at war even with common sense.

Knipping Views Warsaw Pact Summit Communique

AU0211115189 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 30 Oct 89 p 2

[Franz Knipping editorial: "The Key Question of Our Time"]

[Text] The communique of the session of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, which was concluded in the Polish capital on Friday [27 October], contains two statements that are neither sensational nor new, but still remarkable. First, it says that the key question of the present is disarmament. And, second, it announces the adherence to the goal of removing all nuclear and chemical weapons.

Specific importance is given to this dual pledge at a time when, not only in our country but also in allied countries, questions of domestic development are dominating the public discussion. However, the debates about renewal, reforms, and shaping society in line with the respective national and historical conditions cannot be separated from the international surroundings anywhere. Therefore, it is all the more urgent to assess the international events together, within the framework of the alliance of socialist states, to draw corresponding conclusions, and to act in a coordinated way. This is also in accordance with the effort to consider the Warsaw Pact not only as a military alliance, but to develop its political character more strongly.

The Warsaw summit realistically assessed the achievements in disarmament and what can and should be done in

the future. The Soviet-U.S. treaty on the liquidation of land-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is being implemented. There are favorable prospects—despite contradictory and complicated trends in the world—for having the first step be followed by others, perhaps already in 1990. The USSR-U.S. Treaty on the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons has priority, which includes the observation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. At the Geneva disarmament conference, the international convention on the complete ban and destruction of chemical weapons has to be completed. It is supposed that by the end of next year a first agreement among the 23 states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on the radical reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe will be possible.

However, in order to turn chances into reality, great efforts by all forces that are interested in peace and security are needed. Loyal to their program, which is based on the interests of life and survival of all peoples, the states of our alliance will continue to make their contribution to this. As the Warsaw meeting demonstrated, they are acting in tested continuity—aware of the fact that disarmament is and remains the key question of our time.

Soviet Forces in GDR Celebrate GOSR

*AU0911112889 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 6 Nov 89 p 2*

[ADN report: "Festive Event in Wuensdorf Garrison"]

[Text] Wuensdorf (ADN)—With a festive event in the Wuensdorf garrison, the Supreme Command of the Western Group of the USSR Armed Forces celebrated the 72d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution on Saturday [4 November]. On this occasion, Erich Mueckenberger, president of the German-Soviet Friendship Society, conveyed a greetings message from the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED], the State Council, and the GDR Council of Ministers to the participants, among them Commander in Chief Army General Boris Snetkov.

The letter, signed by Egon Krenz and Willi Stoph, says, "With the policy of restructuring, the CPSU has initiated a process which is of decisive importance for the strengthening of socialism and securing peace in the world." The GDR fully supports the USSR's constructive peace policy, its far-reaching initiatives for disarmament, security, and detente, it is stressed in another passage. The GDR will continue to strive energetically to pave the way for a safe world free from the nuclear and conventional threat, in accordance with the joint peace strategy of the states of the socialist community. Strengthening the class alliance and comradeship-in-arms with the USSR is and remains a priority concern.

In his speech, Major General Aleksey Kosvlov, first deputy chief of the Political Administration of the Western Group, said that the restructuring in his country constitutes the continuation of the ideas of Great October. It will never lose its importance because it brought peace and

freedom to the peoples. In close cooperation with the National People's Army, the members of the Western Group fulfill their patriotic and internationalist duty for the protection of peace, he stressed in conclusion.

Krenz Affirms Warsaw Pact Responsibilities

*LD1611210989 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 2002 GMT 16 Nov 89*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The processes of restructuring and the renewal of the political system taking place in the GDR affected neither the GDR's obligations as part of the Warsaw Pact's military coalition nor the functioning of the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces. Egon Krenz, Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] General Secretary, GDR head of state, and chairman of the National Defense Council; Army General Petr Lushev, commander-in-chief of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact Organization; and Chief of Staff Army General Vladimir Lobov stated this today during talks in Berlin.

The interlocutors discussed the situation in the GDR. Krenz briefed them on efforts to renew socialism in the GDR and preparations for the extraordinary SED party congress in December of this year.

Army General Lushev spoke in detail about the activities of the Joint Armed Forces Staff and the implementation of the joint defense doctrine of the participating Warsaw Pact states in their present stage.

Kessler Speaks at 10th CC Session

*AU1411144989 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 11-12 Nov 89 p 7*

[Speech by Heinz Kessler, member of the Central Committee Politburo and GDR minister of national defense, at the 10th SED Central Committee session in Berlin on 9 November: "National People's Army in a New Phase of Development"]

[Text] Dear comrades:

As was noted in the significant speech of the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED], I am fully responsible—no matter in what function I was working—for all omissions, insufficiencies, small and big mistakes, and small and big wrong approaches. I have a moderate share in the many good things that have developed in this country.

I have been asked by many members of the party organizations of the National People's Army [NVA] and of the GDR border troops to express their demand for the speedy convening of a party conference.

Dear comrades:

Fist of all, I would like to wholeheartedly thank all members of the NVA, the GDR border troops, and civilian employees for their sacrificial service.

GDR's Contributions to Military Detente

As was noted in the general secretary's speech, the NVA has entered a new phase of development. What level have we currently reached?

Within the framework of solemn ceremonies the following units were disbanded:

- six tank regiments of the ground forces on 24 October;
- Fighter Aircraft Squadron 7 with the Technical Air Force Battalion and the Communications and Air Traffic Control Battalion on 25 October 1989.

The disbanding of these troop units means a reduction by 4,100 men,

- 3,185 of whom in the ground forces;
- and 915 of them in the Air Force/Air Defense.

In the process of the step-by-step elimination of a total of 600 tanks by the end of 1990, so far 432 tanks have been put out of service according to plan. The eliminated tanks are put into the Ostritz Tank Depot and into other depots until they are finally scrapped or prepared for being handed over to the national economy.

Of the tanks that have been taken out of the Armed Forces so far, until now a total of

- 65 tanks have been taken part, that is, scrapped, and
- 155 tanks are intended for use in the GDR's national economy after the removal of corresponding military equipment.

Taking a tank apart requires about M60,000 in the facilities of the NVA, while in industry about M90,000 are needed for this. Proceeding from this difference in costs, so far 12 to 15 tanks are currently taken apart in a military facility every month.

As of 1 December 1989, training centers of the ground forces will be put into the premises formerly occupied by the tank regiments. These centers have the task of giving a 3-month military training to the draftees who have been called to work in the national economy before they start their work there, and thus to prepare a contingent of 8,100 Army members for this task.

As a contribution to military detente, we also have to consider measures of observing and inspecting maneuvers, which we have taken since the coming into force of the document of the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures and security and disarmament in Europe on 1 January 1987.

For this purpose, in December 1986, a joint working group of the Ministries of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, State Security, and Internal Affairs, as well as of other central state institutions was established, which has fulfilled its functions in an exemplary way.

Until now, in line with the agreements, the GDR has

- announced 14 exercises of the NVA, the Western Group of Soviet Forces, or joint troop exercises on its territory, and

- invited maneuver observers to eight of these exercises, to which 25 CSCE states sent a total of 312 observers.

NVA Members Support the National Economy

In the interest of realizing important projects to increase goods production and, above all, to support investment projects in the construction sector, an average of 5,410 Army members with 310 vehicles per month were deployed during the 1987-88 training year, and 9,100 army members with 322 vehicles during the 1988-89 training year.

The deployment of the Army members in certain focal areas took place with brief interruptions because of the periodic discharge and draft; as of 1988-89, the deployment has been made all year round and in a decentralized manner in 72 combines and enterprises of nine ministries.

In addition, other Army members—in 1989, for instance, up to 1,500—have been used to support the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Foodstuffs Industry and local organs.

By taking into consideration the high economic targets linked with this work, the Army members, only some of whom worked in their original professions, did shift-work in the combines and enterprises, were integrated into their work collectives, and fulfilled the targets for skilled workers to a varying degree—between 65 to 105 percent.

According to the State Planning Commission's calculations, an increase in the production of industrial goods amounting to about M1.2 billion could thereby be achieved in the 1988-89 training year.

This amount does not include the results of the forces subordinate to the Ministries of Transportation, Construction, and Posts and Telecommunications, nor the results of the support provided by youth politics, disaster relief, or special work on specific projects—such as the construction of bridges and water pipes, or the loading of ware potatoes for export to the Soviet Union. Since 30 October, hundreds of Army members have been working—above all in the southern bezirks—as drivers for the supply deliveries, as bus or streetcar drivers, or for the German Railroads. At present, 95 engine drivers and 30 shunters are already at work. Over the next few days an additional 680 specialists will be deployed to the German Railroads. In cooperation with the protective and security services, we are studying further possibilities.

As you know from the press, as a result of a meeting with the health minister, 2,000 Army members are to be used to support the facilities of the health sector as of 1 December 1989.

As a result of the situation that has developed, about 21,000 reservists will not be drafted for reservists' military service from January to April 1990 and are thus available to our national economy.

The checking of the draft [Einberufungsueberpruefungen] from 10 November to 8 December 1989 will not be carried out, either.

These deployments, regulations, and proposals will certainly contribute to preserving—even consolidating—the unity of people and Army.

As a result of the abuse of members of the NVA, and in particular of the GDR border troops, when on vacation and leave, which has recently increased in scope and intensity, insecurity has increased among all units and in the border troops.

Every one of us has to struggle to convince the citizens that such a way of behaving has nothing to do with the freedom of opinion, which has been called for.

We have worked out preliminary ideas to change the border regime. In this process, we proceed from the principle that the future border regime

- must at any time live up to the requirements of protecting the socialist order;
- makes life easier for the GDR citizens; and
- reduces burdens to the national economy.

Furthermore, we are currently working on regulations for alternative military service. After a decision has been made in the People's Chamber, this would make it possible to effectively support—in addition to the work in the national economy, which is already being done—facilities of the health and social sector, environmental protection, as well as communal economy as of May 1990.

In line with the draft of the travel law, we are currently working on analogous regulations for the members of the NVA the GDR border troops, as well as the civilian employees and their dependents.

A last word on the fast changes in everyday service, which the members of the NVA and the border troops are justified to expect from the ministry, the commanders, political organs, and party organizations of all levels.

Under the current conditions of reduction, restructuring, and reorganization of the NVA, the further improvement of service, working, and living conditions is a complicated problem. Last year the most important military regulations were reexamined in the NVA and in the GDR border troops, were adjusted to the current tasks and requirements, or were abolished. Of course, in the Armed Forces, too,—like in the national economy—only what is feasible can be tackled immediately. Everything else has to be solved by taking into consideration an appropriate defense capability, which depends on the respective degree of threat by NATO.

In addition, we have to proceed from the fact that our personnel, material, and financial targets have been repeatedly reduced and that in the future, too, they are to be reduced as much as possible. This results in complicated conditions, for instance, in the field of construction, equipment of barracks, and clothing for Army members.

The new service regulations, which will come into force on 1 December, will pay greater attention to increasing the possibilities of decisionmaking and the responsibility of superiors at all levels as regards the organization of service,

while taking into consideration specific territorial and military conditions. Patronage, devolving or delegating responsibility, as well as rigid forms in, for instance, the organization of everyday service, training, and the services are to be overcome with this.

In addition to the basic changes, which will directly affect service conditions in the NVA and the GDR border troops, comprehensive changes will take place in the life of the Army members. This applies, above all, to improving the living conditions of Army members who live in barracks and hostels.

The amount of extended brief leave [verlängerter Kurzurlaub], which is to be granted to army members who do not live near the base and cannot go back home every day will be increased. Soldiers doing basic military service will receive leave at least three times every 6 months instead of twice, as in the past. Army members who are doing reservists' service will also receive more leave, in line with their service grades. In order to better fulfill the wishes for lively vacations, the right to additional travel time for Army members who do not live near the base will be increased.

We hope that these and other regulations, in connection with interesting public relations work and a convincing presentation of the NVA and the border troops, will also contribute to our fulfillment of our social duties in connection with commissioning young people for the military professions.

Comradeship-in-Arms with the Soviet Army and the Other Armies of the Warsaw Pact

The unity of people and Army, the uniform cooperation among all Armed Forces of the GDR, and the comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet Union and with the other armies of the Warsaw Pact remain an indispensable precondition for protecting the peaceful life and creative work of our working people as well as the future of our children.

I express the firm conviction that the members of the NVA and the GDR border troops will actively participate in the renewal of the socialist society in the GDR.

HUNGARY

Horn Remarks on Arms Talks Clarified

*LD1011231589 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 10 Nov 89*

[Text] A statement by the Hungarian foreign minister could have been misunderstood. Istvan Kulcsar has spoken on this to Laszlo Kovacs, state secretary at the Foreign Ministry:

[Begin recording] [Kulcsar] Mr State Secretary, in Friday's issue of NEPSZABADSAG, a [word indistinct] report appeared about the speech yesterday by Foreign Minister Gyula Horn at Kiskunhalas. They quote him as saying that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary depends on the talks next February in Vienna on the reduction of

military force. We do not know that next February further talks on the reduction of military force will commence in Vienna.

[Kovacs] This is misquoted. It is quite obvious that the foreign minister was referring to the Vienna talks which, as is generally known, are under way, on the reduction of European conventional armed forces and weapons, and it is obvious that the continued withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, beyond what the Soviet Union declared unilaterally, and which is under way, depends on the Vienna agreement. So, no talks are commencing in February, and I would not dare hope either that these talks might conclude in February. What can be hoped is that during the course of next year, an agreement is reached and then the implementation of this, and in the

framework of this perhaps, the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary might happen within 2 or 3 years. [end recording]

National Assembly Votes on Troop Withdrawals

*LD0111172989 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0600 GMT 1 Nov 89*

[Excerpts] We sum up the work of yesterday's Hungarian National Assembly session. [passage omitted]

The deputies adopted a proposal by Zoltan Kiraly, according to which all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the territory of the European states by 1995, and that the Hungarian Government should also promote this.

BRAZIL

Bilateral Agreement on Nuclear Products Signed

PY1411161889 Madrid EFE in Spanish
0336 GMT 11 Nov 89

[Text] Brasilia, 10 Nov (EFE)—Brazil and Argentina have concluded negotiations on an accord under which 32 items produced by their respective nuclear industries will be tax-exempt, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry told EFE today.

The negotiations, which took place during the second meeting of the standing Brazilian-Argentine committee for nuclear policy, began on 6 November. The list of tax-exempt products includes incandescent lamps, air compressors, and laboratory equipment that can be used in the Atucha II (Argentina) and Angra II (Brazil) plants. The list, however, is not final because it will be analyzed by businessmen and official agencies of the two countries, who may introduce changes.

During a visit to Brazil by Argentine President Carlos Menem in August, the presidents of the two countries signed an annex to "Protocol 17" on nuclear cooperation,

negotiations for which began under Raul Alfonsin. The annex establishes that the exchange of tax-exempt nuclear equipment between the two countries may reach \$15 million annually.

"Protocol 17" and five other agreements were signed by Brazilian President Jose Sarney and by then Argentine President Raul Alfonsin when the latter visited Brazil in October [words indistinct]. The cooperative process for promoting bilateral economic integration began in 1985 after a meeting between Sarney and Alfonsin in Foz de Iguazu.

The current Argentine Government has attached particular importance to the integration process. President Menem's first official visit to Brazil reflected this political will to continue the process.

Both Brazil and Argentina have been under pressure because they are the only Latin American countries that have not signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Considering their technological development, this attitude has caused suspicions that they might produce nuclear weapons. Brazil and Argentina have repeatedly stated that their nuclear development is for peaceful purposes.

AFGHANISTAN

Pakistan Testing of Nuclear-Capable Missiles Noted

*LD0611065589 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto
1530 GMT 5 Nov 89*

[Text] BAKHTAR reports that at today's Foreign Ministry briefing, Muhammad Nabi Amani, the head of the ministry's Press Department, stated to domestic and foreign journalists that it has been reported in the mass media recently that Pakistan has been engaged in the production and testing of [name indistinct] type missiles having a range of 80 kms, and [name indistinct] type missiles, having a range of 300 kms, both of which are tactical, operational missiles.

Aslam Beg, chief of the General Staff of the Pakistani ground forces, has stated that these missiles weigh 500 kgs. This weight enables them to carry nuclear warheads.

Amani Comments on Missiles

*LD0711093289 Kabul BAKHTAR in English
0421 GMT 7 Nov 89*

[Text] Kabul, Nov. 5, BAKHTAR—Muhammad Nabi Amani, chairman of the press centre of the Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan, stated in a briefing held in that ministry with the participation of domestic and foreign journalists that recently Pakistani

press had published news on the production of two kinds of rockets named K "7-1" and "7-2" by that country.

Pakistan has tested these two kinds of rockets with ranges of 80 km and 300 km respectively, Amani said.

Aslam Beg, chief of General Staff of the Pakistani Armed Forces has stated that, these new rockets with a weight of 500 kg, are able to carry nuclear warheads," he added. [sentence as received]

Pakistan, Amani added, produces such rockets in time when Western circles as well as Pakistan itself have launched extensive propogation that as if the RA state gets arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union.

If the RA state gets weapons from the USSR that is because of that it is the target of invasions and imposed war, and is compelled to obtain weapons needed for the defence of independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the country in accordance with the friendship, cooperation and goodneighbourliness and protocols concluded with the USSR, he stressed.

But Pakistan which is not threatened from its neighbours and other countries, with the production of these rockets intends to threaten its neighbours, specially the RA, because rockets "7-1" with a range of 80-km and rocket "7-2" with a range of 300 km would threaten Afghan provinces adjoining with Pakistan and central cities of the RA including Kabul respectively. The RA is concerned on the production of such rockets capable of carrying nuclear war heads, Amani concluded.

INF Shorter-Range Missile Destruction Completed at Saryozek

90WC0008A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Oct 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Ladin under the rubric "The INF Treaty Is in Force"; "Soon—the Last Explosion"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] On 27 October, the last of 957 shorter-range missiles earmarked by the treaty for elimination will be destroyed. Our correspondent reports from Saryozek.

Southeastern Kazakhstan is having bountiful fall days. The 20th American inspection team in succession has arrived here, in Saryozek. A momentous assignment has fallen to their lot—that of carrying out the necessary inspection procedures on the final, concluding stage of the elimination of shorter-range missiles in the Soviet Union.

It is appropriate to recall that the first explosions were carried out in the presence of American inspectors headed by U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Michael Khripik. At the time, I had occasion to talk with him immediately after the destruction of the first four SS-12 missiles. It was on 1 August 1988. "I know the Russians a little," said Michael with a smile. "And everything the Soviet officers have contributed toward the success of our work is creating a positive feeling." In turn, Colonel S. Petrenko, commander of the center to direct the destruction of shorter-range missiles, has noted with satisfaction that right from the initial contacts between Soviet military specialists and American inspectors, good, practical relations have taken shape.

And now, a year later, I learn that not once was there any sort of misunderstanding or conflict between the Soviet and American sides in the process of working to destroy the missiles. Everything was done efficiently and according to plan. With both sides carefully observing all the paragraphs of the INF Treaty.

Major I. Kirichenko, commander of the escort group, told me many interesting things about his work with the American inspectors. The front of his identification badge bears the emblem of the Soviet Union and an inscription in both Russian and English: "In-Country Escort." For example, he told me that each American inspection team brought along a "Polaroid" camera, which gave them access to the needed photographs within one or two minutes. But the camera was never employed for verification functions. Nonetheless, a use was found for it. They photographed one another for souvenirs and gave each other the autographed pictures.

The escorts fill one more very important role. When the inspection team completes its work, it draws up an account of the inspection. And so all 19 of the available accounts, executed in Saryozek, have been signed by Major Kirichenko for our side.

Those who operated the villa and worked in the dining room where the American inspection teams stayed also

had good relations with them... "The guests enjoyed the Russian bliny, Kazakh beshbarmak, Ukrainian borscht, curd dumplings..." said master cook Vera Pavlovna Fedorenko. "We also have testimonials to our work." "Thank you very much," U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul Nelson wrote in a book of comments, "for such delicious breakfasts, lunches, and suppers. We probably all gained weight..."

I drive out with Lieutenant Colonel A. Aranovich onto the live-fire field, where preparations are underway for the last explosions. On the way I imagined the field, already familiar to me, and thought that everything there would be pockmarked with craters and strewn with fragments—how many thunderous peals had roared in the uninhabited Kazakhstan steppe. But I did not see anything of the sort this time. Major S. Belous told me how order was maintained on the live-fire field. Fragments from the explosions were collected up and loaded onto trucks on the spot. Many tons of black and colored scrap, not including precious metals, are being extracted from the dismantled guidance systems. A set amount of time is waited after each explosion, by recommendation of the Institute of Biophysics under the USSR Ministry of Health, so that negligible residues produced by the explosion may dissipate once and for all. Incidentally, special analyses have shown that only in the crater itself may some components be observed which yield doses after the explosion somewhat exceeding the background level. At a distance of a kilometer, two, ten, twenty kilometers—no harmful substances are observed in the air or water, or on the ground or plants.

In the morning, after each missile is examined by the American inspectors, the combat engineers begin work. From the very start they have been accompanied not only by Major S. Belous, but also by Captain V. Dubina, commander of the combat engineer company. In my notebook I recorded that about 2.5 tons of TNT were expended on "binding up" the bundle of missiles for the 1 August explosion. Preparations for the explosion lasted more than 2 hours. Now, on the other hand, only 450 kg of TNT are used on each bundle, and all the work is completed in 15-20 minutes. The plans and methods for preparing the missiles for demolition are constantly improving, as are the skills of the specialists.

"As of 27 October a whole class of nuclear weapons, the shorter-range missiles, will no longer exist in the Soviet Union," emphasized V. Leshchenko, deputy chief of the center to direct the destruction of shorter-range missiles, in a conversation with me. "The specialists were able to retrain themselves for the work in a short period of time. They have done an excellent job."

And it would be wrong to forget to name Colonel N. Chizhik and Lieutenant Colonels V. Mamrenko and V. Kabskikh, specialists at the center to direct the destruction of shorter-range missiles. They worked hard to pass their knowledge and experience on to those directly performing the tasks, and they ensured that the work schedule was strictly maintained.

...The first explosion took place in Saryozek hardly more than a year ago. That explosion marked the beginning of humanity's real movement down the path of the destruction of its nuclear arsenals. Now we are on the eve of a new date, which will also be a prominent line in the chronicle of Soviet-American relations and in the chronicle of peace.

Gontar on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization

90UM0077Z Moscow TRUD in Russian 6 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Major General F. Gontar, candidate of military science: "While the Negotiations Are Going On"]

[Text] I want to begin by establishing an important and gratifying fact: The process of practical disarmament is actually going on. Based on the Soviet-American Treaty on Elimination of Medium and Shorter Range Missiles (INF) which was concluded in 1987, the Soviet side has already eliminated two types of shorter range missiles (the OTR-22 and ground-based cruise missiles) and the American side has eliminated the Pershing-1A. Both states are continuing the destruction of their medium range missiles which must be completed by 1992.

Progress in carrying out the treaty mentioned above has instilled the hope in proponents of disarmament that the negotiations being conducted on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, on a nuclear test ban, on a ban and elimination of chemical weapons, and reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe will be more successful and an understanding may be reached on these issues in the very near future. Unfortunately, not everything is occurring as we would like it to although reassuring progress has been noted quite recently.

We might want to look for an answer to the question of why the previously mentioned negotiations have not been very successful in recent days. And here this important circumstance draws attention to itself: The U.S., not manifesting undue haste in disarmament matters, has not canceled even one of its military equipment programs and is planning an intensive increase in production of the latest nuclear missile weapons not only during the 1990's but also in the beginning of the 21st Century.

For example, let us take the Pentagon's plans to modernize the entire nuclear weapons suite, the main directions of which were published abroad in Report-2010. According to the report, total expenditures of 250 billion dollars are envisioned for nuclear rearmament. Let us appreciate the value of this figure. Consequently, the U.S.'s annual expenditures on development and production of new nuclear warheads during the next 20 years will average 1.5 times more than in the current financial year.

I will emphasize that the existing nuclear arsenal in the U.S. already totals approximately 30,000 warheads and about half of them are strategic weapons. About 2,000 warheads of the latest design annually enter the inventory as replacements for obsolete munitions.

In what specific directions is the Pentagon planning radical modernization of nuclear forces in order to strengthen the

potential of a "disarming" first strike? Fifty new highly accurate MX Peacekeeper Missiles have already been deployed into the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces. Each such missile contains 10 individually guided 600 kiloton warheads. They are capable of destroying small targets with practically any degree of hardening. They are planning to deploy 100 MX ICBM's altogether, including 50 mobile missiles.

Sea-based ballistic missile forces are conducting test flights of the new Trident II Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Each such missile carries up to ten 500 kiloton nuclear warheads. By this indicator and also by accuracy of fire, the new missile surpasses the Trident I Missile currently in the inventory by a factor of 3 to 5. They plan to equip not less than 10 Ohio class nuclear submarines with the new missiles. Each such submarine has 24 launch tubes.

They are continuing to equip surface vessels and submarines with Tomahawk Long Range (up to 2,600 km) Cruise Missiles. They plan to increase the range of the latest cruise missiles to 4,500 km.

The program to produce 100 new B-1B Heavy Bombers has been completed in strategic aviation. Each of these aircraft can carry up to 30 long range cruise missiles. As we all know, flight testing of the new B-2 "Invisible" Bomber has begun and it is being produced using Stealth Technology. The U.S. plans to produce 132 of these aircraft at a cost of 70 billion dollars.

The U.S. is developing the ACM [Advanced Cruise Missile] "invisible" cruise missile and will arm the B-1B and B-2 with them. It can carry up to a 200 kiloton warhead and it has up to a 4,500 km range. They plan to produce up to 1,300 of these new missiles in the 1990's.

Under the guise of modernizing tactical nuclear weapons, the U.S. is in fact developing two new types of nuclear missiles.

The Lance II missile has a range of up to 500 km and is being developed for the U.S. Army. A neutron warhead, as well as an ordinary nuclear warhead, is being developed for this missile. I would like to point out that the United States is planning to begin production of the Lance II at the same time that the USSR is destroying its tactical missiles (OTR-23) in accordance with the INF Treaty. Both of these missiles have the same range!

The U.S. is conducting intensive development of air to ground nuclear missiles for tactical strike aircraft. These missiles have a range of approximately 450 km and are capable of destroying ground targets without strike aircraft having to enter into the enemy air defense operations zone.

I must particularly emphasize that the U.S. is working to develop "third generation" nuclear weapons within the framework of the Star Wars Program: X-ray lasers with nuclear excitation, nuclear microwave and kinetic weapons, and others.

As a whole, according to assessments of Western experts, the United States expenditures for production of new models and systems of weapons will total over one trillion dollars during the 1990's.

Therefore, when American leaders once again use such words as "consolidation of power" or "a position of strength," this is not simply a tribute to the past but a confirmation of their aspiration to achieve military superiority over the USSR.

These are all obvious facts and we need to take them into account under all circumstances.

As we know, E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, quite recently spoke with U.S. President G. Bush and held talks with Secretary of State J. Baker. He summed up these meetings at a press conference in Washington: "We conducted serious negotiations on all the issues, including strategic nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear testing, etc. We truly sensed serious progress in all directions."

Such progress undoubtedly reassures us all. And we would like to more quickly sense the practical results of the serious progress at the negotiations. The disarmament process must really progress.

Commentary on SDI Funding Requests

90WC0002A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Oct 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Golts: "A Very Dear 'Deceased'"]

[Text] It would seem that the United States is radically changing its attitude toward the strategic defense initiative which just yesterday was considered a national priority. "The SDI is dead"—this is how the NEW YORK DAILY NEWS confidently characterizes the situation. And this is not simply a sharp figure of speech. Today even in Washington's corridors people recognize that the initial task set for the Star Wars program—the development of a multi-layer space shield, impenetrable by enemy missiles, over the entire territory of the United States—was a utopian idea. This is recognized, albeit not very openly, by practically all leading administration figures, including the staunchly right-wing Vice President Quayle.

"After 6 years of increasing financing," states another U.S. newspaper, THE NEW YORK TIMES, "the program for creating an antimissile defense system is running up against budget cuts and a reduction of its role in U.S. military planning." Judging from articles in the press, today the SDI has now been reduced to a program of "diamond pebbles" which proposes putting into space thousands of simple small missiles which would be able to stop the enemy's ballistic missiles. And even such a pusher of Star Wars as the "father" of the hydrogen bomb E. Teller says that one can speak only of "covering" individual objects.

Until quite recently SDI proponents in the State Department were asserting that Star Wars was an important

trump card in Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. But it was the American adherents of the SDI who led these negotiations into an impasse. And then fairly recently the Soviet Union proposed an unexpected detente. At the negotiations in Wyoming E.A. Shevardnadze announced that the USSR was ready to sign and ratify an agreement on strategic offensive weapons even if no agreement was reached on the ABM problem. Under the condition, of course, that the parties continue to observe the indefinite-term ABM Treaty of 1972.

In my opinion, this is a highly realistic approach. For a paradoxical situation was created: The SDI, which can be applied only in the distant future (and most likely never) even today is standing in the way of the quite real possibility of cutting nuclear weapons by half. So would it not be better to conclude an agreement and begin to reduce offensive potentials? And in this situation will the current or the next administration risk rejecting real achievements in disarmament for the sake of the illusory advantages of the SDI? "The clever course of the Soviets," this same NEW YORK DAILY NEWS points out, "has been the latest nail in the SDI coffin."

But here, alas, the journalist is presenting what is desired as though it were already real. In spite of logic the White House is continuing to spend money so that the SDI, this very expensive 'deceased,' will be even more expensive. The administration has requested 4.6 billion dollars for implementing the SDI in 1990. The House of Representatives allotted only 3.1 billion. But the White House put pressure on the Senate so that it ultimately cut the requested sum only slightly. Thus there will have to be new agreements. And you ask yourself if the practical Americans are really going to continue to waste billions simply for the sake of prestige, not wishing to admit that they made a mistake earlier. Or are they still fostering hopes of creating through space technology some kind of make-weight for their first-strike weapons?

Rear Admiral Pushkin Urges End to Nuclear Weapons Testing

90WC0012A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 02 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by Rear Adm A. Pushkin, Candidate of Naval Sciences: "Catastrophes of Which We Learned Years Later"; first two paragraphs are SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA introduction]

[Text] Chernobyl rocked the entire world, but it stands to reason that this tragedy affected us most. The shadow of radioactive dust touched the Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia. In the time of glasnost the scale of the catastrophe became known to millions on millions of Soviet citizens and other earthlings.

But the fact is that mankind or, more correctly, countries possessing nuclear weapons, essentially have voluntarily organized catastrophes similar to Chernobyl for many decades.

Elugelab Atoll in the Pacific ceased to exist in 1952 as a result of a test of the "superbomb," as the United States then called the hydrogen bomb. It simply evaporated. The United States conducted numerous above-ground and underwater tests of atomic devices on Bikini Atoll, also in the Pacific, from 1946 through 1954. Twenty-three years later American authorities declared the atoll "safe" and permitted its inhabitants to return home. Some time later, however, they again had to be evicted. Water, fish, mollusks, as well as the fruit of coconut palms and the bread tree turned out to be contaminated by products of radioactive decay and could not be used as food. As reported by the Associated Press, "Bikini residents driven from this island will not be able to return for the next 30 and perhaps even 100 years due to radiation."

Disaster finally struck. Another test was conducted on Bikini Atoll in 1955. According to the weather forecast it was assumed that the mushroom cloud would be carried northward during the tests, but it began travelling rapidly eastward because of an unexpected wind shift. Geiger counters aboard American ships of the screening force began clicking. Personnel took cover in ship spaces, and automatic systems for washing off radioactive dust were activated. But the "death ash" caught both local residents and American servicemen unawares on Rongelap and Rongerik atolls. Two hundred sixty-four persons affected by a mysterious ailment were sent to the military hospital on Kwajalein Island. All of them, like many of the Japanese fishermen from 856 vessels which were fishing in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands that season, became victims of radiation sickness.

Things also were no better with our nuclear tests. The first explosions of a hydrogen weapon at the Semipalatinsk test site in 1949 were conducted without any protective measures at all. Residents of a number of villages were subjected to irradiation. During the 1940's and 1950's the USSR Ministry of Health permitted a person to receive 50 roentgens during the first 24 hours and up to 100 over a week's time. Thirty to forty tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk test site alone in 1958, but no radiation measurement data were preserved in test site materials. Soon we detonated a monstrous 58 megaton device over Novaya Zemlya equal to 3,000 bombs of the kind that destroyed Hiroshima and exceeding by 20 times the cumulative explosive force of all bombs dropped during World War II. It must be assumed that more radioactive fallout occurred on the Kola Peninsula after that explosion than after Chernobyl, and winds carried very dangerous elements—strontium 90 and cesium 137—around the world.

This small excursion into history is necessary. It serves as a vivid illustration of those mortal dangers which were lying in wait for people as a result of nuclear weapon tests.

Two tragedies involving nuclear space age technology have occurred of late: the death of the Challenger crew and the accident at Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Station. They harshly reminded us that people have only scraped the surface in the mastery of fantastic forces. The fact is,

however, that what happened at Chernobyl was not something new. It was the 27th reliably known major accident at an atomic electric power station by count since the first atomic power station began operation at Obninsk. Accidents aboard nuclear submarines attest to the possible tragic consequences.

Present nuclear weapon tests at underground test sites also are hazardous. One of them, arranged by France on Mururoa Atoll, generates constant alarm and protests in South Pacific countries. Some scientists in Latin America assert that underground explosions could be the cause of devastating earthquakes of recent years in Chile, Ecuador and Peru. They also do not exclude a seismic effect of French explosions on Mexico and Central America.

Despite the fact that the United States has been conducting nuclear explosions underground since 1963, the danger of radioactive radiation remains for residents of the state of Nevada and neighboring Mexico. According to Mexican scientists, a leak of radioactivity is registered in Mexico from 31 out of 100 of these tests.

There are grounds to be concerned over the fate of a ban on nuclear explosions in space, where such tests will be required to check out a nuclear-pumped laser gun and so on during realization of SDI. This means that strontium 90 and other fission products again will get into the atmosphere and fall to Earth in the form of radioactive fallout. The United States would hardly conduct such tests over its own territory. The ocean expanses with their islands and archipelagoes obviously will be the release point again.

Positive ideas acquire genuine value only when they are materialized. The Soviet Union has demonstrated that ability. In making the decision to introduce a moratorium and subsequently to extend it, the Soviet side proclaimed as it were a withdrawal from harsh nuclear confrontation fraught with an explosion deadly for all human civilization.

The cessation of nuclear tests which Moscow unilaterally undertook and the repeated extension of the moratorium until 1 January 1987 was a proposal addressed above all to the United States to make a breakthrough into new political thinking in the main military sector. It was aimed at curtailing the most dangerous process of modern times—the qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons. Moreover, this is a universal measure in the sphere of disarmament by which we can immediately restrict the development of all nuclear systems—strategic, medium-range, and operational-tactical.

A test ban is the fastest and most radical of all arms limitation measures realistically implementable at the present time: it permits bypassing a large number of problems involving disproportions of a technical, strategic, geostrategic and political character. The fourth round of Soviet-American talks on a limitation and cessation of nuclear tests now has begun. There is no doubt that a positive solution to such problems will permit improving the radioactive and ecological situation in Semipalatinsk and in the state of Nevada. Statistics of oncologic illnesses

for Semipalatinsk Oblast which considerably outstrip average data for Kazakhstan attest to the insistent need for this. The number of people with blood diseases has doubled there since 1970.

There are too many nuclear weapons in the world already. So many have been stockpiled now that there is an equivalent of 15 tons of TNT for each person on Earth. Present nuclear weapon stockpiles are sufficient to kill every earthling many times over. This is why every sector of the globe freed of nuclear weapons can become a contribution to political detente. For example, 13 states declared the South Pacific to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and South America also declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Thus even now access to nuclear weapons is closed in vast regions of the globe. One would like to see both Europe and Asia and then also vast expanses of the ocean (which thanks to nuclear-powered missile submarines and other ships are not free of nuclear weapons) to be such a zone in the near future. The USSR has proposed and is proposing that states which possess nuclear weapons declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, to be in effect until conclusion of a treaty on a total and general nuclear weapon test ban.

By its recent lengthy unilateral moratorium and other practical affairs, Moscow has proven the sincerity of intentions and the reality of achieving the goal that has been set. The development of a U.S.-USSR dialogue and the INF Treaty created a favorable background for the next steps along the path to a nuclear-weapon-free world. New times also require a new policy. The Soviet concept of advancing into the future by eliminating all kinds of mass destruction weapons was set forth by M. S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986. This process already has begun with the destruction of two classes of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The Soviet Union is cutting back a considerable portion of its Armed Forces unilaterally and without any compensation. Noting that the overall scope of these reductions exceeds what the Bundeswehr has at its disposal, the West German journal SPIEGEL evaluates them as the second most important breakthrough on the path to peace after signing of the INF Treaty.

We see that our country, guided by the ideals of strengthening the security of all mankind, has introduced a large set of new proposals which attest to the fact that the USSR's attempt to reduce military confrontation is receiving new material reinforcement. The upcoming Soviet-American summit must yield new results in deterring the arms race and stopping nuclear weapon tests.

Telegram Protesting Nuclear Testing Sent To Gorbachev, Yazov, Cheney

90WC0010C Alma-Ata KHAZHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Against Nuclear Testing"]

[Text] The nuclear testing, which was conducted at the beginning of October at the Semipalatinsk test site, has

evoked new actions by the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement. O. O. Suleymenov, its president and a USSR people's deputy, has sent a telegram to M. S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet; D. T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense; and R. Cheney, U.S. secretary of defense, expressing concern and calling for decisive steps to overcome the nuclear opposition of the superpowers. It pointed out that a joint moratorium on nuclear weapons testing is necessary as a saving action for all mankind.

The Semipalatinsk party obkom and oblispolkom urgently raised the question of closing the test site. The Karagandinskiy coal basin workers' committee addressed the same demand to the republic's government. In the name of the miner participants in the Nevada-Semipalatinsk antinuclear movement, it stated that it was ready to declare a preventive strike if tests are continued at the test site.

Meeting To Protest Nuclear Testing Held in Semipalatinsk

90WC0010B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Sept 89 p 1

[Article by KazTAG correspondent: "Nuclear Explosions Under a Ban"]

[Text] Semipalatinsk—On 15 September, a three-day protest demonstration against nuclear explosions, which was organized by activists in the oblast section of the "World's Doctors To Prevent a Nuclear War" movement and the Alma-Ata branch of the "Next Stop Soviet" International Youth Organization, began here not far from the nuclear test site. Envoys from Denmark and Norway joined the representatives of the medical VUZ in Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, Riga, Kaunas, Semipalatinsk, and other cities in the country.

During meetings of many thousands in which the city's workers and public participated, the speakers spoke ardently and with deep feeling about the need to intensify the antinuclear struggle, increase the unity of peace-loving forces, and strengthen trust, friendship and good neighborly relations between peoples.

An appeal to the heads of government of the Soviet Union and the United States was adopted with a call to halt nuclear weapons testing and to intensify the solution of ecological and environmental protection problems.

Concerts of political songs; "round table" meetings on health matters; discussions with scientists, radiation specialists and the military and servicing personnel at the nuclear test site; and meetings and assemblies in the oblast's cities and villages were also held within the framework of the demonstration. A mass demonstration will be held later in a symbolic peace camp located on the border of the underground nuclear explosion zone.

FRANCE

Tactical, Strategic Arms Policy Discussed

90ES0053D Paris LE MONDE in French
5 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Ambassador Francois de Rose]

[Text] In an interview with LE MONDE on 14 July, Jean-Pierre Chevenement said that our military system's cost effectiveness was "among the most favorable in the world."

There is no doubt that in making such an assessment, our defense minister was not using financial and military parameters. The possibilities for action on the international level which a defense system provides for a government are essential and perhaps the deciding factor.

This applies in particular to nuclear weapons, which are weapons of deterrence whose cost and effectiveness cannot be evaluated exclusively or even mainly in budgetary or operational terms. The sums which the United States and the Soviet Union have invested in their nuclear arsenals may seem huge, but if they have prevented World War III, their "payback" in terms of saving human lives and the values of civilization is absolutely inestimable.

'Single Strike'

For France, any idea of competing quantitatively with the two superpowers is out of the question, with the result that the effectiveness of the threat from its strategic weapons depends on the number and power of those capable of hitting enough important targets to make the possible destruction of the latter unacceptable to the adversary.

The criteria are different when it comes to weapons which we call prestrategic and which the United States and NATO call tactical, the difference in terminology being due to differing concepts of use.

In the view of our allies, those weapons must make the concept of flexible response—which was adopted after massive retaliation ceased to be the appropriate response to aggression scenarios in Europe—credible and executable. The number and variety of such weapons must present the aggressor with a double risk: that of nuclear attacks on his forces of penetration and logistic bases to prevent his success with a strategy for lightning-quick victory and, secondly, that of an escalation in strength and battle area that could involve his territory. The number of such weapons and their power are therefore inseparable from the search for effectiveness.

The problem presents itself differently in France's case. France's prestrategic weapons are no longer intended to halt the adversary but to warn him that since our vital interests are threatened, he will be exposing himself to fire from our strategic weapons if he does not stop.

Several statements by the president of the republic and the minister of defense have made it clear that that "final warning" would consist of a "single unrepeatable strike."¹

The weapons designed for that mission are the Hades surface-to-surface missile, which has a range of 480 km and is to enter service in 1992, and the medium-range air-to-surface missile (ASMP), which is said to have a range of about 300 km. The intention is to produce 60 launchers for the Hades (that is, 120 missiles) at an announced cost of 15 billion francs and 75 launchers for the ASMP at a cost which, if one includes the aircraft carrying it, will be much higher.

This brings up two questions.

The first question is why giving the enemy such a signal would require some 150 to 200 delivery systems, some of which would be carrying thermonuclear warheads of perhaps 200 to 300 kilotons.

The use of those weapon systems "in a single strike" would be the equivalent of several hundred Hiroshimas and perhaps even a few Chernobyls if the explosions occurred at ground level.

Consequently, whereas the effectiveness of our strategic threat depends on having a minimal number of weapons with the minimal power for carrying it out, the final warning is independent of those constraints, since here it is not a matter of influencing the course of operations but of "warning" the adversary that we are upping the ante and are on the verge of the unthinkable. If we had to give 100 or more warnings at once to make the message clear, that would negate the very notion of "warning."

Let us make it clear that we are not criticizing either those weapon systems, the concept of the single strike, or the concept of the final warning. The thing that causes the problem is the lack of consistency between the announced objective, the intended weapons, and the doctrine of their use.

The response sometimes made to this is that those worries are unfounded: that neither the doctrine nor the weapons will be called into service because the "dialectic" of deterrence is situated at the psychological level. No doubt. But still it must not be forgotten that the hour of crisis is also the hour of truth. This means that everything depends on the credibility of actions on both sides. The threat of using a club too heavy to lift would be ineffective. A weapon of deterrence more than any other is required to fit a rational concept on penalty of being no more than an instrument of bluff.

Either we believe in the doctrine of the single warning strike—and if so, why all those delivery systems and warheads capable of causing a cataclysm on our continent—or else those quantities and their power are justified by a different strategy. But if so, what strategy?

Justifiably, and on the same grounds as his predecessors, Mitterrand refuses to be specific on that point, saying simply that our strike would have to hit "whoever turned into a threat" and that "there is no justification for saying that the warning would take place in German territory."²

Hades Flexibility

What that means in plain language is that those strikes would be aimed at Soviet military forces, preferably beyond the frontiers of both Germanies. That is, given the range of our delivery systems, Poland and Czechoslovakia. But to get beyond East German territory, the Hades missile would have to be in position in the FRG's territory. The least one can say is that the deployment of such a missile between the Rhine and the Elbe is not a sure thing, considering the resistance of West German public opinion to the presence of nuclear weapons in its territory.

The Hades missile's remarkably flexible performance would undoubtedly permit its use against distant or close targets with payloads ranging from a few kilotons to one-third or one-fourth of a megaton, thus giving the president of the republic a maximum number of possibilities. But a single salvo spread over several hundred kilometers and perhaps among an equal number of targets would be more like a general offensive than a warning.

For its part, the medium-range air-to-surface missile could theoretically reach the western districts of the USSR. Provided, that is, that the aircraft carrying it could be refueled over enemy territory. Considering the Warsaw Pact's defenses and the fact that we would be attacking an adversary on his guard, the chances for penetration would be limited.

At a time when the arms limitation talks are showing more promise than ever, it may seem incongruous to be discussing aggression scenarios and strategic concepts. But while those talks do make it possible to contemplate the future "with greater hope," as Mitterrand said recently, the fact remains that as long as our country has to watch over its security, getting the best return from its defense efforts will require the best possible balance between the concepts in question and the means of implementing them.

To someone whose only information is that in the public domain, the outcome of our prestrategic weapon programs tilts inexorably in the direction of cost.

The outcome is negative from the political standpoint in that it is based on the idea that a French president might unleash offensive operations of unparalleled scope, and with repercussions that could affect all of Europe, against nations which, despite their (forced) alliance with the possible aggressor, are nonetheless our natural and historical friends. And that he would be doing so as a warning to a third party! Nor is the outcome justifiable from the standpoint of security, since its monstrous character contradicts the rationality of the deterrent maneuver. Lastly, as far as the taxpayer is concerned, it is costing a lot to pay for products that do not correspond to their announced purpose.

Those are all so many reasons for our government to provide the necessary explanations—or, as one is tempted to say, to adjust its fire.

Footnotes

1. Chevenement, quoting Mitterrand in an address to the Academy of the Soviet General Staff in Moscow on 5 April 1989.
2. LE MONDE, 21 October 1987.

NORWAY

Expert on Desired Naval Defense Strategy

90EN0043A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
3 Oct 89 p 8

[Article by Werner Christie: "Confidence-Building Action at Sea Must Have a Global Effect"]

[Text] Whoever controls the ocean off our long coast controls Norway. That is how it has been since the time of the Vikings. In those days, surface vessels—the Viking's ships—constituted the striking power. At present, submarines are important and, last but not least, aircraft are important in naval strategy. Even during World War II, naval battles were fought out in which all weapons were delivered by aircraft from aircraft carriers while ships never had direct contact with the enemy.

While the Soviet Union's Baltic Sea Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Fleet have to move through narrow straits and passages to get out, the Northern Fleet has free access to the open sea and the northern stretches of ocean, which have gained increased significance. At the same time, the Kola Peninsula bases—the biggest concentration of thermonuclear weapons in the world—are our nearest neighbors in the north. In addition to these geographic facts, we should remember that the Norwegian Sea, in spite of its name, is not Norwegian and that 4,000,000 Norwegians can only influence naval strategy to a very slight extent.

Global Effort

Naval forces are mobile and the oceans of the world are dominated today by ships and aircraft from the Soviet Navy and the U.S. Navy. Therefore confidence-building action must be based, first and foremost, on negotiations between the two superpowers. Naval forces do not need to be used in the geographic area where there is a conflict. Perhaps it is more to the purpose to exert pressure in other corners of the world—in naval strategy, the game being played extends over the entire globe. Therefore confidence-building action must be global and not regional. Nevertheless, we in Norway, indeed, are naturally primarily interested in conditions in our part of the world.

Multinational

We desire an Allied presence off our coast, and NATO is providing that, too, to protect the vital supply lines over the Atlantic Ocean, among other things. Multinational NATO forces could be desirable here, so that the alliance's solidarity and defensive nature would be demonstrated. On the other hand, that presence must represent a striking

force that is big enough to have a deterrent effect, and consequently to have the effect of preventing war. In practice, the American aircraft carrier groups have that effect. The United States, NATO, and we Norwegians want an advanced naval strategy to be pursued, and that is not the same as an offensive strategy.

Limitations

The Soviet Union has proposed limitations to the Allied use of the northern sea waters, but that is not in Norway's interest. Since the American Atlantic Fleet has its home base in Virginia and the Soviet Northern Fleet has its on the Kola Peninsula, such an arrangement would inevitably mean that we would get farther behind the invisible iron curtain off our coast.

Among the world's seafaring nations, an ingrained dislike of clipping the wings of naval forces prevails. However, agreements that regulate behavior and prevent incidents are something else. It can be a matter of rules for avoiding collisions and misunderstandings, target practice warnings, and rules covering military engagements. Last but not least, communications between ships and direct contact capabilities between Washington and Moscow (the hot line) are necessary. In addition, there are many agreements in these fields. Against the background of recent aircraft and submarine incidents, Norway recently delivered a draft agreement in Moscow.

Transferred to Ships

There has been a great deal of progress where the limiting of land-based weapons is concerned, but on the naval side the advance has not been so pronounced. Quite the contrary. There is a certain amount of danger that land-based nuclear weapons will be transferred to ships. That is a development that may be gratifying in Central Europe, but it is of more significance where the northern regions are concerned.

UNITED KINGDOM

Secretary King on Maintaining Nuclear Deterrent

*LD1011070889 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 0509 GMT 10 Nov 89*

[Report by Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION defense correspondent]

[Text] It would be "lunacy and almost criminal" if Britain was to give up its longstanding policy of strong defences in the face of Eastern Bloc reform and disarmament, Defence Secretary Tom King said today.

In his first major interview since moving to the Ministry of Defence [MOD] in the summer, he stressed Britain's nuclear deterrent could not be put on the table in disarmament talks "for the foreseeable future". The former Northern Ireland secretary pointed to difficulties being faced at the conventional arms talks in Vienna and warned there was a "considerable way" to go. He reaffirmed Britain's NATO's need to keep up on guard against the

Warsaw Pact and he believed the public would understand. It is true the present tremendous changes might make some people think we don't need defence any more," he said. "But it is a very human emotion to see your own country properly defended."

Events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were happening fast and it was impossible to predict how they would finally turn out, he said. Progress had been achieved by maintaining strong defences to ensure that freedom in the west was not overwhelmed by communist pressures and intimidation. "By being prepared to maintain strong defences, we have seen this opportunity for improvement," he said. "The one thing which would be lunacy and almost criminal would be just at this moment to change our approach which could damage this process of reform."

"We must keep our defences strong but respond in a positive and constructive way to the approaches from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact."

He expressed concern that the public did not fully appreciate the difficulties being faced in the conventional disarmament talks. Confidence had to be built up between East and West to ensure genuine removal and destruction of weapons, together with a workable verification deal. Significant cuts in nuclear arsenals could only be considered as long as each nuclear power was able to preserve its deterrent capability. "We certainly have our own deterrent and I would not entertain any change in that situation while we still face the threat of nuclear weapons being used against us," he said. "And so we have a considerable way to go for the foreseeable future."

There has been widespread speculation that agreed cuts in conventional arms in Europe will affect the MOD's future orders, most notably the new Challenger 2 tank. But Mr King played down the impact arms reductions would have on equipment procurement. "If you have fewer weapons they must be good and they must be reliable," he said. "Arms reductions do not remove the need for modernisation of what you have and replacement of old equipment with new."

Mr King said some tough bargaining was now under way in the autumn budget costings exercise to decide which projects would be funded next year. One MOD source has said there was "a lot of blood around", and Mr King agreed there were extra costs this year on matters like security, measures to improve recruitment, and retention of manpower. But he ruled out the need for a comprehensive review of defence commitments, manpower and equipment. Despite the continuing problems with the 22 billion pounds sterling European fighter aircraft programme, he said he was hopeful of a successful outcome.

Britain and West Germany favour different radar systems—Britain the Ferranti ECR-90, and Germany the AEG/Marconi MSD2000. New studies into both systems are currently under way and Mr King said he was keen to proceed, though he was unable to predict when the programme might progress to the next stage.

On the possible basing of the United States' new nuclear-capable fighter, the F-15E Strike Eagle, in Britain, Mr King confirmed discussions with the U.S. authorities had been going on for some time. But he stressed: "nothing has been decided yet. We have not decided whether they will be based here."

Warhead Problems May Delay Deployment of Trident

51500022 London *THE DAILY TELEGRAPH* in English
8 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Simon O'Dwyer-Russell: "Trident Delay Now Inevitable"]

[Text] Ministers are reconciling themselves to a significant delay in the deployment of Britain's £9 billion Trident independent nuclear deterrent.

The expected slippage in the programme is due to production problems with warheads in Britain, compounded by a recent decision by the US Senate to slash funding for the Trident D-5 programme, on which Britain's system is based.

Confidential briefing papers, prepared in recent weeks for ministers, follow last month's appointment by the Government of Sir Francis Tombs, chairman of Rolls-Royce, to review the Trident programme and recommend ways to speed development and production of warhead components.

The papers are understood to make clear that slippage in the programme may result in international pressure on Britain in the mid-1990s to scrap Trident or to cut warheads in line with superpower reductions in nuclear forces.

The problems faced by the Trident programme were discussed by Mrs Thatcher and key ministers, including the Chancellor, Mr Lawson, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Major and the Defence Secretary, Mr King, following a defence seminar at Chequers last weekend.

Professor Laurence Martin, Vice-Chancellor of Newcastle University, who took part in the seminar, said yesterday

that the Trident issue was "obviously concentrating minds in Whitehall. Officials and Ministers seem to be reconciling themselves to the reality of delay."

Trident delays are also embarrassing the Labour Party following its decision last week to abandon unilateralism. If Labour wins the next General Election, it may find itself the Government carrying out Trident deployment.

Pressure to cancel or reduce the size of the British Trident force may come primarily from the United States which, in an effort to secure Soviet agreement to cuts of more than 50 per cent in strategic weapons by the mid-90's, could apply pressure to France and Britain to throw their own independent deterrents into the talks.

Britain will rely heavily upon American goodwill in production and maintenance of its Trident force, and such pressure may prove hard to resist.

According to senior Ministry of Defence sources, the first Trident submarine, Vanguard, is now unlikely to put to sea on schedule in 1994. Even when she does, it will be with fewer than her complement of 128 warheads.

Warhead shortages also mean that deployment of the second Trident submarine will have to be delayed.

Until now the Government has maintained that, despite a shortage of skilled workers and delay at a production plant, Trident would be in front-line service in 1994.

According to Professor Lawrence Freedman, of King's College, London, who advises the Commons Defence Committee on nuclear issues, "the situation is becoming critical."

The Government last week launched a lobbying campaign in Washington to secure a reversal of the Senate Appropriations Committee decision last month to cut the US Navy Trident programme's £1.1 billion budget.

The missile and propulsion systems for Britain's Tridents will be manufactured in the United States, while warheads will be produced in England. The Senate cut Trident funding after two successive failures during sea tests in March and August.

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